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1 Autopoiesis: The Origins of Cybernetics and the Politics of Cold War 
The September, 1953 issue of The Rotarian, the monthly magazine of Rotary 
International, spoke in breathless terms of the emergence of a new science and the monumental 
changes it would make in the lives of ordinary Americans. Called  “cybernetics,” this new 
science  was described by the magazine as an “electronic brain system of industry,” that has 
“made it possible for us to warm up an oil refinery, paper box factory, textile mill, chick 
hatchery, or card filing operation and run indefinitely—with nobody on the premises except 
perhaps a lone inspector or two.” In the long term, the impact of cybernetics on industrial 
processes was imagined to “have a more profound effect on us than atomic energy.”1
The original vision of cybernetics, however, was, simultaneously broader and more 
precise than any of these usages suggest. The product of wartime research into automatic control 
in anti-aircraft guns, cybernetics had profound impacts on diverse fields like anthropology, 
economics, cognitive science, and political science — all disciplines in which the cyber- prefix at 
first glance seems to be completely out of place. The task of cybernetics is to examine for 
isomorphic or structurally similar relationships between the organizations of different systems, 
 
This conceptualization of cybernetics meshes nicely with the current understanding of the 
term. “Cybernetics” and the “cyber-” prefix are ubiquitous in contemporary culture, so 
ubiquitous, in fact, that words like “cyberspace,” “cybercrime,” and “cybercafé” no longer seem 
cutting edge, but the clichéd artifacts of 1990s Internet culture. In 1953, as in 2010, the 
colloquial understanding of the term “cybernetics” was fluid, used to describe the developing 
sciences of automation, computation, robotics, and artificial intelligence.  
                                                          
1 Carleton Beals, “Cybernetics,” The Rotarian, 1953, 14. 
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regardless if they are social, biological, or mechanical. The central idea is that purposeful 
systems with similar organizational structures behave in similar ways. 
Although the intellectual descendants of cybernetics like artificial intelligence (AI) and 
systems theory have enjoyed a great deal of success in the United States, its own impact in 
America was essentially limited to the academy. Even in the universities, after a brief period of 
broad influence, it was largely subsumed by its numerous and broadly dispersed disciplinary 
offspring.  
In the Communist Bloc, however, this situation was very nearly inverted. After initially 
being dismissed and harshly criticized for its alleged incompatibility with dialectical materialism, 
the state philosophy of the Soviet Union, party planners and scientists enthusiastically embraced 
cybernetics as an ideologically and scientifically modernizing force. Throughout the Communist 
world, the discipline was lavished with state funding and official praise. In the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) in particular, a generation of young technocrats saw cybernetic 
methods as part of a solution to the perennial problems of inefficiency and rigidity posed by the 
traditional Soviet model of economic planning.  
This introductory chapter serves as a contextual foundation for subsequent ones, 
exploring the early history of cybernetics and explaining the central concepts of the discipline.  
Through an examination of cybernetics and its failure to take root in its country of origin, this 
chapter gestures to larger issues this thesis addresses: the modification of cybernetics by the East 
German Marxist-Leninist philosopher Georg Klaus and its subsequent utilization by East 
German economic planners. After a brief account of the origins of cybernetics—which will 
provide the reader with a working understanding of cybernetics, its claims, and its terminology— 
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this chapter will also situate the remainder thesis within the broader historiographical matrices of 
East German history and the history of science.  
1.1 Cybernetics, an Early History 
On June 27, 1940, President Roosevelt issued an executive order establishing the 
National Defense Research Committee (NDRC, later the Office of Scientific Research and 
Development or OSRD).2 This organization, headed by the MIT engineer Vannevar Bush, was 
tasked with the coordination of scientific research for the purpose of developing advanced 
weapons systems.3  Among the highest priorities for the committee were the development of 
microwave radars and anti-aircraft fire-control systems—both projects of the utmost strategic 
importance to the British, who were embroiled in a defensive air war with Nazi Germany.4
Norbert Wiener, a highly-regarded and almost comically eccentric MIT mathematician, 
was assigned to work in the fire-control division of the NDRC. Wiener’s project was to develop 
a system that would improve the accuracy of anti-aircraft guns. This was no simple task—it 
required the nearly instantaneous mechanical correction of the gun to compensate for aircraft 
velocity and evasive maneuvers taken by the enemy aircraft. Working with Julian Bigelow, a 
young electrical engineer, Wiener constructed a model fire control system. Given the enormous 
number of possible trajectories, Wiener opted for a probabilistic approach, which brought into 
accounted for the past locations of the aircraft and the physical limits placed on its maneuvering. 
By extrapolating the most probable flight trajectory, the gun could “predict” the aircraft’s 
 
                                                          
2 The NDRC was superseded a year later by the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) which 
continued the committee’s work. It is perhaps most famous for being the supervisory body for the Manhattan 
Project.  
3 Order Establishing the National Defense Research Committee, June 27, 1940, Folder: Vannevar Bush, President's 
Secretary's File (Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration), 1933 - 1945, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library and Museum 
Website; version date 2009 
4Report of the National Defense Research Committee-6/27/40-6/28/42, Folder: Vannevar Bush, President's 
Secretary's File (Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration), 1933 - 1945, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library and Museum 
Website; version date 2009 
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location, greatly improving accuracy.5
Wiener, feeling that his contributions to the war effort were being undervalued by the 
OSRD, abruptly resigned from the project in March 1942.
 Wiener imagined both the enemy aircraft and the anti-
aircraft gun as both being part one closed system, with the gun exhibiting goal seeking behavior, 
though environmental inputs, or in engineering jargon: “feedback.” 
6
The first published summation of this approach came a year later in the journal 
Philosophy of Science. In the article, “Behavior, Purpose, and Teleology,” Wiener, Rosenblueth, 
and Bigalow sought to rehabilitate the idea of teleological (or goal-seeking) behavior, which had 
been widely disparaged by behaviorists in the 1940s.
 Although Wiener’s fire-control 
project did not have any immediate wartime impact, it did mark a turning point in the 
mathematician’s thought.  Working with Bigalow and the Harvard neurobiologist Arturo 
Rosenblueth, Wiener began to systematize his findings into more general philosophy of goal-
seeking behavior that would apply to both mechanical and biological systems.  
7
The clearest way to explain this is by example. The basic unit of analysis in cybernetics is 
the loop, a closed system that senses an environmental change, or feedback, and then responds, 
causing another change in the environment. There are two varieties of feedback: positive and 
negative. Positive feedback refers to a system in which the environmental input generates more 
of itself in a manner that gradually leads to runaway growth. Microphone feedback is a good 
 In this paper, the three men develop the 
idea that purposeful behavior is the product of circular-causal systems in which a system 
continually responds to feedback. 
                                                          
5 For an exhaustive treatment of this subject see Wienerʼs work on the subject, nicknamed by OSRD scientists the 
“Yellow Peril” for its yellow report cover and its legendary difficulty Norbert Wiener, Extrapolation, Interpolation, 
and Smoothing of Stationary Time Series, with Engineering Applications. (Cambridge, MA: Technology Press of the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1949). 
6 Peter Galison, “The Ontology of the Enemy: Norbert Wiener and the Cybernetic Vision,” Critical Inquiry 21, no. 1 
(Autumn): 240. 
7 Arturo Rosenblueth, Norbert Wiener, and Julian Bigelow, “Behavior, Purpose and Teleology,” Philosophy of 
Science 10, no. 1 (1943): 18-24. 
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example of this kind of feedback: sound enters the loop through the microphone and is amplified 
through a speaker. That sound emitted by the speaker is then picked up by the microphone and 
amplified; the cycle continues and a runaway effect, the screeching of the speaker, is produced. 
Negative feedback works on the opposite principle: feedback enters the system and the 
system in turn responds by acting in an opposite manner; this has the effect of controlling and 
stabilizing the environmental input. The classic example of a negative feedback system is the 
thermostat. Feedback enters the system as a result of an environmental change, in this case a 
temperature increase, the system then responds by controlling the temperature through the use of 
a cooling device. Negative feedback systems, in short, act when “a disturbance occurs in a 
system, [which] causes an undesired output” and responds by subsequently generating an “error 
signal [that] flow[s] down the forward path to make necessary corrections.”8
Both of these kinds of feedback systems can be observed in a variety of situations: the 
runaway effects of positive feedback, demonstrated in the microphone feedback example, can 
also be observed in the self-reinforcing effects of hyperinflation, the accumulation of platelets in 
a blood clot, or the stockpiling of weapons in an arms race. Likewise, the equilibrium-seeking 
behavior of negative feedback systems has been observed in the homeostatic behavior of 
organisms, or in potlatch systems where distributive stratification is rectified through socially-
prescribed feasts and gift-giving.
 Negative feedback 
systems are self-regulating and seek to preserve equilibrium. 
9
                                                          
8 Julius T. Tou, Digital and Sampled-Data Control Systems, McGraw-Hill Electrical and Electronic Engineering 
Series (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), 1. 
9 For analysis of early works on biological feedback systems see Frederick E. Warburton, “Feedback in 
Development and Its Evolutionary Significance,” The American Naturalist 89, no. 846 (1955): 129-140; For a 
concise summary of systems theoretical and social ecological approaches to potlatch see Bonnie J. McCay, 
“Systems ecology, people ecology, and the anthropology of fishing communities,” Human Ecology 6, no. 4 (1978): 
399-400. 
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As shown in the examples above, the language of purposeful behavior in feedback loops 
applies equally to social, biological, and mechanical systems. The processes in which purposeful 
behavior is achieved in all of these systems is isomorphic, that is it to say it is structurally 
similar. Wiener and Rosenblueth in a later article articulate this notion of functional equivalence 
of goal-oriented behavior across the mechanical/biological divide in the form of a rhetorical 
question: “Let us consider a car following a man along a road with the clear purpose of running 
him down. What important difference will there be in our analysis of the behavior of the car if it 
is driven by a human being, or it is guided by the appropriate mechanical sense organs and 
mechanical controls?”10
                                                          
10 Arturo Rosenblueth and Norbert Wiener, “Purposeful and Non-Purposeful Behavior,” Philosophy of Science 17, 
no. 4 (October 1950): 319. 
 The implied answer is that there is no important difference. 
Following the conclusion of the war, the Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation organized a series 
of conferences devoted to the exploring the issues raised by Wiener, Rosenblueth, and Bigalow 
in “Behavior, Purpose and Teleology.” The first of these conferences, entitled “Feedback 
Mechanisms and Circular Causal Systems in Biological and Social Systems,” took place in the 
spring of 1946 in New York City. The participants and the foundations judged this conference so 
productive that another was quickly organized for that fall. 
These conferences were by design radically interdisciplinary boasting attendees from 
across the physical and social sciences. The conferences were also very informal; although 
papers were presented, they were often highly speculative in nature and primarily served as a 
jumping-off point for discussion sessions. These sessions were the real highlight of the 
proceedings; during these informal talks the invited participants would draw links across 
disciplinary boundaries.  
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Owing to their informal nature, no written record was kept of the first five Macy 
Conferences. On the suggestion of Norbert Wiener, Heinz von Förster, an Austrian physicist and 
later founder of the Biological Computer Laboratory at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, was tasked with preparing transcripts of the subsequent conferences. By the sixth 
meeting in 1950, the conference’s name was changed to “Cybernetics: Circular Causal and 
Feedback Mechanisms in Biological and Social Systems.”  All told, ten meetings were held, with 
the last Macy Conference taking place in the spring of 1953. 
Emblematic of the kind of work that was influenced by the discussions at the Macy 
Conferences was Gregory Bateson’s Communication, the Social Matrix of Psychiatry, co-written 
with the psychiatrist Jurgen Ruesch. The book’s central argument is that “communication is the 
matrix in which all human activities are embedded” and that the communicative environment 
shapes the cultural contours of the patient-therapist relationship.11 To demonstrate its claims, the 
authors pull ideas (in the spirit of the Macy Conferences) from a variety of disciplines, 
synthesizing “psychiatric, psychological, and anthropological concepts…with theories derived 
from cybernetics and communication engineering.”12
The functioning of a patient in an interpersonal situation can only be ascertained 
if the psychiatrist exposes himself to the impact of the messages of the patient, 
and once he has received these, if he watches the impact of his own 
communications upon the patient. In such a circular system the observation of 
feedback operations enables the psychiatrist to correct messages received and 
sent…
 Drawing on concepts from cybernetics, the 
book imagines psychiatry as a kind of feedback system: 
13
Like Wiener’s anti-aircraft fire-controls, the patient-psychiatrist relationship is an iterative 
process in which responses to environmental data are observed and then corrected. Where the 
 
                                                          
11 Jurgen Ruesch and Gregory Bateson, Communication, the Social Matrix of Psychiatry, First Edition. (New York: 
Norton, 1951), 13. 
12 Ruesch and Bateson, Communication, the Social Matrix of Psychiatry, 14. 
13 Ruesch and Bateson, Communication, the Social Matrix of Psychiatry, 86. 
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purpose of fire-control systems was the destruction of enemy aircraft, the goal of the patient-
psychiatrist system is the achievement of culturally-normative thoughts and behaviors. As 
Wiener has noted, these same principles can be applied across the social, biological, and physical 
sciences—indeed the discovery of isomorphic or analogous system structures across disciplinary 
lines is one of the cornerstones of the discipline . 
 Despite its initial success in the United States, as the 1950s wore on cybernetics as an 
individual field of research began to decline. Owing largely to the unavailability of funding, the 
field was largely superseded by a variety of fields inspired by cybernetics—AI, computer 
science, game theory, and others—that received massive military grants.14
1.2 Historiography  
 Cybernetics, after a 
brief period of official condemnation, became the subject of increasing attention in the 
Communist Bloc in the late 1950s. By the 1960s the social and economic applications inspired 
many reformist tendencies within Eastern Europe’s Communist Parties. One of these internal 
reform movements in East German, proposed major institutional changes, most notably to the 
organization of the country’s planned economy, which despite being one of the strongest in the 
Soviet sphere of influence was dogged by shortages and inefficiencies. 
The English language historiography on cybernetics in East Germany is very limited; no 
full-length studies have been devoted to the topic and only a few journal articles have appeared 
on the subject. Two happy exceptions to this are a book chapter devoted to the subject in Peter C. 
Caldwell’s Dictatorship, State Planning, and Social Theory in the German Democratic Republic 
and an article by Benjamin Robinson appearing in the November 2003 issue of 
Modernism/modernity entitled “Socialism’s Other Modernity: Quality, Quantity and the Measure 
                                                          
14 For an excellent examination of this, see Paul N. Edwards, The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of 
Discourse in Cold War America (The MIT Press, 1997). 
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of the Human” 15
Robinson’s project is an interesting one, focusing on East German modernity and 
problems of qualitative and quantitative distinction. In doing so, he examines the work of Georg 
Klaus and the East German literary figure Franz Fühmann (1922-1984). He argues that these two 
writers were “not concerned with the empirically achieved and measurable quality of daily life in 
East Germany, but the possibility of apprehending an underlying qualitative difference between 
their system and that of the West, where their system figures for them as both present actuality 
(energeia) and future potential (dynamis).”
 Both of these works, while dealing with roughly the same subject matter of this 
present work, have very different goals: Caldwell examining the contradictions in economic 
planning and social theory in the GDR, and Robinson exploring the philosophical and literary 
parameters of East Germany’s socialist modernity. 
16 Fühmann and Klaus, he argues, were engaged in a 
task of distinguishing a distinct form of modernity, socialist modernity, from that of Western 
capitalism, Fühmann in his fiction and Klaus in his construction of cybernetic models and 
appraisal of socialist science. As such, these writers were forced to interrogate the priorities of 
their society and to tease out the qualitative differences between the two systems. More 
importantly, Robinson articulates the philosophical stakes in tackling the problem of 
differentiation between the two societies, he writes “what is at stake in the discussion of 
socialism is not a distinction between two views of the world, but between two ontological 
totalities, each systematically organizing their worlds.”17
The final chapter of Caldwell’s Dictatorship, State Planning, and Social Theory in the 
German Democratic Republic, “From Planning Metaphysics to Cybernetics” analyzes three 
  
                                                          
15 Peter C. Caldwell, Dictatorship, State Planning, and Social Theory in the German Democratic Republic. 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Benjamin Robinson, “Socialismʼ s Other Modernity: Quality, 
Quantity and the Measure of the Human,” Modernism/modernity 10, no. 4 (2003): 705-728. 
16 Robinson, “Socialismʼs Other Modernity: Quality, Quantity and the Measure of the Human,” 704. 
17 Robinson, “Socialismʼs Other Modernity: Quality, Quantity and the Measure of the Human,” 722. 
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figures in East German cybernetics, Georg Klaus, Uwe-Jens Heuer, an East German legal 
theorist, and Gunther Kolmey, a GDR economist. Caldwell focuses his attention on Klaus’s  
1966 Kybernetik und Erkenntnistheorie and its implications for the GDR’s New Economic 
System, (a subject that will be the focus of a later chapter). On a broader level, in this chapter 
and throughout the book, this is an injunction that the scholar of the GDR take Marxism-
Leninism seriously. While our works have different focal points, in this respect they share a 
common spirit. 
A final work, one that examines neither cybernetics nor East Germany, has shaped my 
thinking on the subject. Andrew Cross’s 1991 article “The Crisis in Physics: Dialectical 
Materialism and Quantum Theory” examines the controversies surrounding dialectical 
materialism and quantum theory in the post-World War II communist world.18 The dialectical 
materialist view of physical nature, as summarized by Cross is as follows. In dialectical 
materialism the universe is composed of “objectively existing matter, forming a complex, 
interconnected unity.”19 Matter is understood to be in a permanent state of flux, and motion (and 
thus energy) is seen as an attribute of matter, not a separate thing. And perhaps most importantly, 
human knowledge of the physical universe is seen to be provisional and historically 
conditioned.20
For reasons too complex to detail here, quantum mechanics was seen by (Soviet and non-
Soviet) communist philosophers as being philosophically opposed to dialectical materialism. In 
response to this perceived crisis in physics/philosophy, one American-born, communist 
theoretical physicist, David Bohm, sought to reconcile the two fields. Bohm’s “hidden variables” 
  
                                                          
18 Andrew Cross, “The Crisis in Physics: Dialectical Materialism and Quantum Theory,” Social Studies of Science 
21, no. 4 (November 1991): 735-759. 
19 Cross, “The Crisis in Physics: Dialectical Materialism and Quantum Theory,” 737. 
20 Cross, “The Crisis in Physics: Dialectical Materialism and Quantum Theory,” 737. 
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interpretation of quantum mechanics was experimentally indistinguishable from the then 
standard Copenhagen interpretation, but did not share the former field’s perceived “idealism.”  
Bohm’s mechanics, like Klaus’s cybernetics, received little attention outside of communist 
circles, but both made acceptable a field with important practical benefits for East German 
society. 
The primary locus of application, both real and theoretical, for cybernetics in East 
Germany was in the economic sphere.  Walter Ulbricht and other proponents of cybernetics saw 
in the discipline a panacea for all of the GDR’s structural economic problems. By 
mathematically modeling the nation’s economic system, engineers, factory managers, and other 
technicians could transform the republic’s lagging economy into a technologically advanced 
socialist powerhouse, all without recourse to market mechanisms. The emphasis placed on the 
potential for cybernetics to reform and revitalize the East German economy and the ultimate 
failure of this reform brings my study into dialog with a highly developed literature on the East 
German economic system. 
Jeffrey Kopstein’s The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany, 1945-1989, 
approaching the subject from the perspective of a political economist, offers a convincing 
explanation for the failure of the East German economy.21
                                                          
21 Jeffrey Kopstein, The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany, 1945-1989 (University of North Carolina 
Press Enduring Editions, 2009). 
 In brief, Kopstein’s argument is that 
in order to reform the economic sector, the East German Sozialistische Einheitspartei 
Deutschlands, (the SED) would have to embark on a number of politically dangerous policy 
changes such as wage, work norms, and price reform. These kinds of reforms would have had 
the potential to generate unrest that might surpass the 1953 workers’ revolt and destabilize the 
regime. Hemmed in by the politically conscious working class, the SED instead sought a solution 
12 
 
  
in a series of Soviet-style work campaigns, collectively comprising what Kopstein calls a 
“campaign economy.”22
Raymond Stokes, in his Constructing Socialism: Technology and Change in East 
Germany, 1945-1990, also pursues an economic line of inquiry, albeit from a different angle.
 Furthermore, consistent with my own argument, the author argues that 
the New Economic System opened up a fault-line between party apparatchiks and the technical 
intelligentsia, and that Kurt Hager’s attack on cybernetics in the November 1971 issue of Einheit 
marked one of the final battles between party officials and the technical intelligentsia. 
23
The role of the East German technical intelligentsia occupies a central place in my thesis, 
thus an examination of this group and its place in society is necessary. Fortunately a number of 
excellent studies on the technical intelligentsia in the GDR exist. Dolores Augustine’s Red 
Prometheus: Engineering and Dictatorship in East Germany, 1945-1990 offers an excellent 
examination of the relationship between the technical intelligentsia, primarily engineers, and the 
SED.
 
The central issue the book seeks to address is the longevity of the GDR, a state, which, after all, 
lasted longer than the Third Reich or Weimar Germany. Stokes offers science and industrial 
technology as the reason for the SED’s long tenure in power, with the narrative of socialist 
technological progress legitimizing the regime. Interestingly, Constructing Socialism departs 
from the standard narrative of technology in the GDR, arguing that East German scientists and 
engineers were highly innovative in the face of crumbling capital stock and international 
economic marginalization.  
24
                                                          
22 Kopstein, The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany, 1945-1989, 12. 
23 Raymond G. Stokes, Constructing Socialism: Technology and Change in East Germany, 1945-1990 (The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2000). 
24 Dolores L. Augustine, Red Prometheus: Engineering and Dictatorship in East Germany, 1945-1990 (The MIT 
Press, 2007). 
 She argues that many engineers who were carry-overs from the Nazi-era considered 
themselves “apolitical experts” and viewed themselves as disengaged from ideology. In the early 
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years of the GDR the technical intelligentsia was generally treated well, accorded reasonably 
high status and allowed a good deal of autonomy on research projects. This changed after the 
building of the Berlin Wall. No longer fearing the departure of skilled engineers through the 
open Berlin border, the status and treatment of the technical intelligentsia, already distrusted for 
their bourgeois backgrounds, declined. 
Recently, the economic history of the GDR has seen an upsurge in scholarly attention. 
Motivated by an effort to examine the methods by which the SED was able to secure a baseline 
of popular legitimacy and to present East Germany as the exemplar of a uniquely socialist brand 
of modernity, these recent texts have examined the way ordinary East Germans navigated and 
negotiated their country’s consumer landscape. Donna Harsch’s Revenge of the Domestic, for 
example, examines the ways that women placed pressure on the SED, spurring the regime’s shift 
from having an almost single-minded productivist economic outlook, to becoming a “welfare 
dictatorship” which placed an emphasis on consumer, domestic goods.25 Judd Stitziel’s 
Fashioning Socialism similarly explores the consumer landscape of the Republic, arguing that 
“fashion in the GDR embodied the ambiguities and contradictions that arose on the seam 
between socialism and capitalism, between images of abundance and experiences of scarcity.”26
These works offer a necessary corrective to the Cold War characterization of the GDR as 
the “Second German Dictatorship,” a totalitarian Unrechtstaat that enjoyed no popular 
legitimacy and whose citizens were deprived of all agency. After die Wende, the landmark 
 
In doing so, Stitziel claims that politics was effectively displaced onto consumption; thus 
consumer abundance was the measure of the regime’s legitimacy.  
                                                          
25 Donna Harsch, Revenge of the Domestic: Women, the Family, and Communism in the German Democratic 
Republic (Princeton University Press, 2006). 
26 Judd Stitziel, Fashioning Socialism: Clothing, Politics and Consumer Culture in East Germany (Berg Publishers, 
2005), 168. 
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example of this was the proceedings of the Bundestag’s Enquete Commission (1992-1994), 
whose 18 volume report, as A. James McAdams put it, refused to view “the Communist system 
as anything less than an undifferentiated evil.”27 The work of scholars like Harsch and Stitziel, as 
well as Katherine Pence and Paul Betts in their important edited volume Socialist Modern, have 
gone a long way to providing a more nuanced view of East German society.28
Other older texts like Thomas A. Baylis’s The Technical Intelligentsia and the East-
German Elite: Legitimacy and Social Change in Mature Communism and The Changing Party 
Elite in East Germany by Peter Christian Ludz while outdated, still present ideas that my thesis 
will have to take into consideration.
 These works join 
an older literature on East German dissidents that has explored the ways that intellectuals like 
Robert Havemann or Bärbel Bohley navigated the matrix of orthodoxy and state repression to 
make their voices heard. While these studies provide an important and necessary account of 
resistance to the SED, these East German dissidents should not be taken to be representative of 
the population of intellectuals as a whole.  
29
The following chapter, “Feedback” will provide an extended discussion of cybernetics 
from a theoretical and philosophical perspective, addressing the reception of the science in the 
GDR and the broader Eastern Bloc. Although it begins with an examination of the early rejection 
of the science in the Soviet Union, the primary focus of the chapter is the writings of Georg 
Klaus (1912-1974) an East German philosopher and cybernetician. Klaus’s reconciliation of 
 These texts offer competing structuralist accounts of the 
formation and makeup of the SED party elite. 
                                                          
27 A. James McAdams, Judging the Past in Unified Germany (Cambridge University Press, 2001), 112. 
28 Katherine Pence and Paul Betts, Socialist Modern: East German Everyday Culture and Politics (University of 
Michigan Press, 2008). 
29 Thomas Baylis, The Technical Intelligentsia and the East German Elite: Legitimacy and Social Change in Mature 
Communism, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974); Peter Christian Ludz, The Changing Party Elite in 
East Germany (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1972). 
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cybernetics with Marxist-Leninist theory was almost single-handedly responsible for 
cybernetics’ rise to prominence in the GDR.  
In his works, Klaus strips the objectionable linguistic, logical, and metaphorical 
foundations of the Anglo-American version of cybernetics and replaces them with locally 
appropriate Marxist stand-ins. In doing so, he casts cybernetics as an “auxiliary science” of 
Marxism-Leninism, rather than a field of study in its own right. Klaus’s philosophical task 
involves removing the extant philosophical and scientific underpinnings of an idea and re-
articulating them in a pragmatic and situationally appropriate manner—a process analogous to 
porting software from one operating system to another. In both cases, many of the surface 
features remain the same, yet the underlying “code” changes radically. Through an examination 
of Klaus’s project to reconcile cybernetics with dialectical materialism, this chapter presents 
arguments on the nature of East German science, cross-Bloc scientific transfer, and the 
localization of knowledge into pre-existing epistemological frameworks. 
Where the primary consideration of the second chapter was theoretical matters, the third 
chapter “Control” focuses resolutely on praxis. This chapter examines the ways East German 
theorists, planners, and other functionaries sought to refashion the state, the economy, and 
society along cybernetic lines in the 1960s. This was a broad-based plan of reform, which 
involved the construction of cybernetic models of a myriad of social interactions, ranging from 
the operation of state-owned enterprises to the nature of the student-teacher relationship. 
The main proponents of cybernetics within policymaking circles were a group of young 
technocrats, who Peter C. Ludz described in his 1968 book Parteielite im Wandel (translated in 
1972 as The Changing Party Elite in East Germany) as members of an “institutionalized counter-
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elite.”30
                                                          
30 Ludz, The Changing Party Elite in East Germany. 
 In addition to providing an examination of the ideology of these functionaries, this 
chapter will also examine cybernetics as a site of generational and factional dispute; a conflict 
the “institutionalized counter-elite” would ultimately lose. 
The thesis will close with some remarks on the fate of cybernetics and an examination of 
its theoretical and conceptual heirs. In addition, the conclusion will seek to rehabilitate 
cybernetics from its reputation of a science of social control and manipulation, examining the 
potentially emancipatory character of cybernetics. 
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2 Feedback: Georg Klaus, Socialist Cybernetics, and the Boundaries of East German 
Orthodoxy  
In 1967, the West German weekly Der Spiegel commented on the emergence of a new 
language being spoken by Walter Ulbricht, the head of the Socialist Unity Party (Sozialistische 
Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED), and a generation of young technocrats in East Germany—
the language of cybernetics. For these party officials, cybernetics, the study of communication 
and control in social, mechanical, and biological systems, represented a way to circumvent the 
inefficiencies that dogged planned economies. Using the methods of cybernetics, these young 
technocrats believed that they could construct models of a socialist economic system that 
maximized efficiency, ensured adequate distribution of resources, and generally avoided the 
common pitfalls of economic planning. Most importantly, by simulating market mechanisms 
cybernetic models would hypothetically eliminate the need for the massive legions of party 
functionaries that collected and analyzed economic data. Indeed, Der Spiegel reported that one 
group of technocrats nicknamed their new modeling computer “the functionary guillotine.”31
Cybernetic ideas, however, were not always welcomed in the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) or in the broader communist world. In the infancy of the field in the early 
1950s, cybernetics was brutally attacked in the East German party press for its bourgeois origins 
and its perceived incompatibility with Marxism-Leninism, the state philosophy of the GDR. Yet 
by the mid sixties, a hybrid cybernetic/Marxist-Leninist philosophy was hailed by the SED, 
generally regarded as one of the most dogmatic and repressive state parties in Eastern Europe, as 
the saving grace of the GDR’s planned economy. Articles espousing cybernetics as an 
“extremely useful scientific instrument of socialist economic management” appeared in Neues 
 
                                                          
31 Neue Welt,” Der Spiegel, July 24, 1967, 52. 
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Deutschland, the communist party newspaper, and Einheit, the SED’s theoretical organ.32 Even 
Walter Ulbricht, the General Secretary of the SED, sang the praises of cybernetics in official 
pronouncements and in the press and made the discipline a cornerstone of his New Economic 
System.33
A combination of factors explain the gradual, but never universal, acceptance of 
cybernetics within East German policy-making circles. The Khrushchev-era thaw relaxed the 
insistence on orthodoxy in the sciences, allowing for more frank discussions of scientific matters 
throughout the Soviet Bloc. In East Germany a new generation of pragmatic specialists who saw 
themselves as non-ideological engineers emerged and formed a receptive audience for cybernetic 
ideas.
 The young technocrats quoted by Der Spiegel and many others with the ranks of the 
SED thought by using the systems-analysis methods of cybernetics the East German economy 
could be made efficient and competitive with the capitalist West. 
34
                                                          
32 Helmut Koziolek, “Die Marxsche Analyse der gesellschaftlichen Production und die Lehre von der sozialistischen 
Wirtschaftsführung,” Einheit: Zeitschrift für Theorie und Praxis des wissenschaftlichen Sozialismus 22, no. 7 
(1967): 833-847. 
33 See, for example Walter Ulbricht, “Significance and Vital Force of the Teachings of Karl Marx for Our Era,” in 
On Questions of Socialist Construction in the GDR. From Speeches and Essays. (Dresden: Zeit im Bild, 1968). 
34 For an extended treatment of this group, see Augustine, Red Prometheus. 
 But more than any other factor, the tireless efforts of the East German philosopher, 
logician, and cybernetician Georg Klaus (1912-1974) to reconcile cybernetics with dialectical 
materialism eventually ensured official acceptance of the discipline. This chapter is an 
examination of that reconciliation. In dozens of books, articles and other writings between the 
late 1950s until his death, Georg Klaus sought to reconcile cybernetics with dialectical 
materialism, the official state philosophy of the Soviet Union and its satellites, including the 
GDR.  
This was no easy task in the philosophically constricted atmosphere of the GDR, as 
Heinz Liebscher, a student and long-time collaborator of Klaus, noted: 
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the GDR lacked any united front of a philosophical avant-garde, there were only 
“Winkelrieds’’ (an expression which Klaus claimed for himself) who had the 
courage to press ahead and “to steer the arrows of the opponent onto himself.”35
Like Arnold von Winkelried, the legendary martyr of the Old Swiss Confederacy who 
threw himself on the pikes of advancing Hapsburg armies, breaking their lines and ensuring 
victory for his comrades, Klaus saw himself as engaging in a sometimes self-destructive battle 
against traditionalist elements in the party from the late 1950s until his death in 1974. Klaus’s, 
however, was a peculiar form of opposition. Unlike Robert Havemann, a chemist and an East 
German dissident (who Klaus himself attacked in the party press as revisionist), he was never 
reprimanded by the party, much less expelled.
 
36 Instead, for a number of years during the 1960s, 
Klaus was one of the most important philosophical voices in the country, with articles (and 
citations of his works) frequently appearing in East Germany’s most important philosophical and 
theoretical journals, Einheit and Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie. Many of his ideas 
profoundly influenced the course of SED policy, especially in the economic sector, where he 
advised the planner and Politburo member Erich Apel in the reform of state-run enterprises 
(Volkseigener Betrieb, VEB).37 His great success led to East German defectors referring to him 
in 1964, according to one CIA report, as “a new and more effective Havemann.”38
Adopting a metaphor from computer science, I refer to Klaus’s project as “localization.” 
In the software industry, localization refers to the repackaging of a piece of software for a 
different cultural environment. This requires more than a simple process of translation. It entails 
 
                                                          
35 Heinz Liebscher, “Philosophie in der DDR,” Unpublished Manuscript, n.d., 16, 
http://www.heinzliebscher.de/Unveroeffentlichte/PhilosophieDDR.pdf. 
36 Robert Havemann was an East German chemist, communist, and Nazi resister who was expelled from the SED 
and eventually placed under house arrest for challenging the party’s alleged philosophical dogmatism in public 
lectures. 
37 Ilse Spitmann, “East Germany: The Swinging Pendulum,” The Problems of Communism 16, no. July-August 
(1967): 16. 
38 Central Intellegence Agency, “The Prussian Heresy: Ulbrichtʼ s Evolving System,” Intelligence Report, CIA FOIA 
Electronic Reading Room, June 29, 1970, 4, http://www.foia.cia.gov/CPE/ESAU/esau-45.pdf. 
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an overhaul of the user interface, tailoring the logical and metaphorical attributes of a program to 
local conditions. The resultant piece of software is functionally equivalent to the original, despite 
its lexical, logical, and metaphorical alterations. Similarly, Klaus’s philosophical task involved 
removing the extant philosophical and scientific underpinnings of an idea and re-articulating 
them in a pragmatic and situationally appropriate manner. In doing so, Klaus cast cybernetics as 
an “auxiliary science” of Marxism-Leninism.39
2.1 Exchange: Cybernetics in the Soviet Bloc 
 
Klaus’s project of localization, however, was fraught with complications. Seeking to 
demonstrate the commensurability of cybernetics with Marxism-Leninism, the philosopher went 
to great lengths to demonstrate parallels between the two fields, often recasting Marxian 
concepts like the base-superstructure model of society in cybernetic terms. This practice, while 
rhetorically effective, led to accusations that Klaus was replacing Marxism-Leninism with 
cybernetics. Charges like this ultimately led to the discipline’s demise in the GDR in the early 
1970s, but only after a period of considerable influence in East German policy-making circles 
and within the country’s philosophical and theoretical journals. 
This chapter examines the hybrid Marxist-Leninist/cybernetic philosophy of Georg 
Klaus. It begins a brief reception history of the discipline in the Eastern Bloc. The remainder of 
the chapter will focus on the life and work of Klaus, providing a close examination of the 
contours of his project of localization. 
Unlike in the United States, where cybernetics was met with overwhelming, if somewhat 
naïve, popular enthusiasm, the initial reception of cybernetics was icy in East Germany and the 
broader Communist world. In the early 1950s, Marxist theoreticians from around the Eastern 
                                                          
39 Georg Klaus, Kybernetik und Gesellschaft (Berlin: VEB Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1964), 71. 
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Bloc generally agreed that cybernetics and dialectical materialism, the philosophy of Karl Marx 
and the official ideology of the various communist parties in Eastern Europe, were 
fundamentally incommensurate.40 Soviet and other Eastern Bloc commentators chided the new 
field as “obscurantist,” dismissed it as a “pseudoscience” that subscribed to an “idealistic 
epistemology,”41 and referred to the new field’s practitioners as “semanticist-cannibals.” Articles 
and essays with vitriolic titles like “The Science of Modern Slaveholders” and “Cybernetics—a 
‘Science’ of Obscurantists” filled the pages of academic and popular periodicals in the early 
postwar years. 42
Such is the first cause of “physical” idealism. The reactionary attempts are 
engendered by the very progress of science. The great successes achieved by 
natural science, the approach to elements of matter so homogeneous and simple 
that their laws of motion can be treated mathematically, encouraged the 
mathematicians to overlook matter. “Matter disappears,” only equations remain.
 
The primary critique leveled against cybernetics by communist theoreticians in this early 
period was that cybernetics was an “idealist philosophy” that privileged the world of ideas over 
that of concrete material reality. These critics of Wiener and cybernetics repeatedly cited Lenin’s 
1908 philosophical work Materialism and Empirio-criticism, in which he defends the materialist 
worldview against alleged idealistic influences. In it Lenin wrote: 
43
For Lenin, this desire of scientists to push for the use of mathematical models and toward deeper 
abstraction of the material world is reflective of a reactionary, idealistic Weltanschauung. In such 
a worldview “the process of abstraction, represents physical objects in a purely logical way as 
 
                                                          
40 Following East German practice, I use “dialectical materialism” and “Marxism-Leninism” interchangeably. 
41 Maxim W. Mikulak, “Cybernetics and Marxism-Leninism,” Slavic Review 24, no. 3 (1965): 22. 
42 Slava. Gerovitch, From Newspeak to Cyberspeak: a History of Soviet Cybernetics (Cambridge, Mass.; London: 
MIT, 2004), 119. 
43 V.I. Lenin, “Materialism and Emperio-Criticism,” in V.I. Lenin: Collected Works, vol. 14, 3rd ed. (Moscow: 
Progress Publishers, 1972), 308. 
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nonmaterial, which leads to the ideal of the ‘disappearance’ of matter.”44
A less substantial, but no less vitriolic, line of criticism of cybernetics offered by Marxist 
writers stemmed from the discipline’s alleged status as a “bourgeois science.” Representative of 
this rhetorical trend is the entry for cybernetics in the 1954 Soviet Short Philosophical 
Dictionary. In this volume, the field is derided as both a “reactionary pseudo-science” as well as 
“an ideological weapon of imperialist reaction.”
 Likewise, for critics of 
“cybernetic idealism” as they called it, the highly mathematicized, abstract field of cybernetics in 
general and cyberneticians’ understanding of the concept of “information” (discussed at length 
below) in particular was deeply problematic. Furthermore, as a theory of the operation of 
systems, cybernetics was viewed by these thinkers as completely removed from considerations of 
material reality. 
45
The death of Stalin in 1953 and the subsequent ideological thaw led to a liberalized 
atmosphere in the sciences, both in the Soviet Union and its satellite countries. This general trend 
was accelerated after a new party line was promulgated in Soviet science. In the spring of 1954 
 In this view, the content of science in general 
and cybernetics in particular is a product of the mode of production; like culture as a whole in the 
Marxist conception, science is part of the social superstructure which is directly determined by 
the economic base. To these commentators it naturally followed that cybernetics, a science 
founded in capitalist America with the philanthropic support of the Macy Foundation (founded 
by a shipping and petroleum heiress), would necessarily be reflective of bourgeois, “imperialist” 
ideology. The disparity between the frenzied media portrayals of this new science and its 
concrete accomplishments did nothing to subdue this suspicious response.  
                                                          
44 “The Philosophic Legacy of V. I. Lenin in the Struggle for Materialism in Science,” Mechanics of Composite 
Materials 6, no. 2 (March 1, 1970): 177 Translated from Mekanika Polimerov, No. 2 pp. 195-196 March-April 
1970. 
45 David Mindell, Slava Gerovitch, and Jérôme Segal, “Cybernetics and Information Theory in the United States, 
France and the Soviet Union,” ed. Mark Walker (London; New York: Routledge, 2003), 81. 
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the Party Central Committee criticized the Soviet scientific community for its rigid dogmatism in 
the agricultural sciences, typified by the disastrous, ideologically-charged genetic ideas of 
Trofim Denisovich Lysenko.46
In November of 1954, amidst this atmosphere of comparative scientific freedom in the 
USSR, the Austrian-born, Soviet mathematician E. Kolman
 
47 presented a lecture entitled “What 
is Cybernetics?” before the Academy of the Social Sciences of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union.48
of course nothing is easier than to declare cybernetics to be a mystification, a 
pseudo-science, etc. But it seems erroneous to suppose that our opponents occupy 
themselves with nonsense, spend enormous amounts of money, create entire 
institutes, call national conferences, publish special journals—all in order to 
discredit Pavlov’s teachings and to drag idealism and metaphysics into 
psychology and sociology. There are more effective and less expensive ways of 
carrying on idealist propaganda and warlike agitation than preoccupation with 
cybernetics.
 While the majority of this lecture amounted to a thoughtful, measured 
introduction to cybernetics (along with formal and symbolic logic) for the general scientific 
audience, it also contains an important political component. Kolman began the lecture by taking 
to task Soviet and Bloc theoreticians who focused too much on the “bourgeois,” “reactionary” 
origins of cybernetics and dismissed its practical value. Remarking on the absurdity of some of 
the charges that were being directed toward the science, Kolman argued: 
49
Clearly believing that cybernetics holds much potential value for Soviet society, Kolman 
proffered an impassioned defense of the subject, citing passages from Marx, Engels, Lenin, and 
Stalin for ideological support. This lecture, which was published in the Soviet journal Voprosy 
Filosofii (Questions of Philosophy), contributed to a reappraisal of the previously taboo field of 
 
                                                          
46 Mikulak, “Cybernetics and Marxism-Leninism,” 453. 
47 Variously transliterated as Ernst Kolman or Arnošt Kolman. I have maintained the transliteration provided within 
a given source. 
48 For an interesting, albeit brief, biographical sketch of Kolman see G. G. Lorentz, “Mathematics and Politics in the 
Soviet Union from 1928 to 1953,” Journal of Approximation Theory 116, no. 2 (June 2002): 169-223. 
49 E. Kolman, “A Soviet View of Cybernetics,” trans. Anatol Rapoport, Behavioral Science 4, no. 2 (1959): 134. 
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cybernetics. While Kolman was transferred to Prague for presenting this lecture, his efforts were 
not in vain.50 In translation, the lecture stimulated discussion on the subject in the international 
Marxist community. It appeared, among other places, in the French Marxist journal La Pensée, 
and more importantly for the sake of this study, as a scientific supplement to the East German 
serial Forum in 1955.51
2.2 Encoding: Georg Klaus, a Biographical Sketch 
  
With Soviet opposition to cybernetics largely removed by 1955, and the Kolman 
translation offering a cogent, albeit brief, Marxist defense of the science, most of the ideological 
(and geopolitical) obstacles to a reappraisal of cybernetics in East Germany were overcome. In 
this new, more “relaxed” ideological climate, the task of explicating and propagating the science 
fell to Georg Klaus, a philosopher, chess master, and long time communist, who played a central 
role in the rehabilitation of cybernetics in East Germany. 
In Georg Klaus, a man with almost unparalleled political credentials, cybernetics could 
not have found a better defender in the ideologically charged atmosphere of East Germany. Had 
Klaus not had a fairly unblemished history as a life-long Communist, a party organizer, and a 
jailed opponent of fascism, it is hard to imagine he would have had the success he did promoting 
his scientific philosophy. Klaus was born in Nuremberg in December of 1912 into a proletarian 
household—his father was a railroad worker and his mother a housewife. From a young age, he 
showed great academic aptitude, and in 1932 enrolled at the University of Erlangen with the 
intention of getting a degree in mathematics. With the ascendency of the Nazi party in 1933, he 
was prevented from continuing his studies for political reasons; he was the leader of the Northern 
Bavarian section of the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD). Following his removal 
                                                          
50 M. Csizmas, “Cybernetics—Marxism—Jurisprudence,” Studies in East European Thought 11, no. 2 (1971): 92. 
51 E Kolman, “Was ist Kybernetik?,” Forum 23, no. 9 (1955): Supplement. 
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from the university he was arrested on counts of high treason and incarcerated for a total of five 
years between 1933 and 1939, spending two of these years at Dachau. During this time in prison, 
Klaus developed mathematical models for chess games, his lifelong pastime.52
Klaus was released from prison on April 20, 1939 as part of an amnesty program on the 
occasion of Hitler’s birthday but as a communist was prevented from continuing his studies. 
After his release, he worked for three years at a pencil factory in Kassel before being drafted into 
the Wehrmacht to fight on the Russian Front. He saw enemy action and was wounded three 
times. After the war he spent a brief period in an allied POW camp in Belgium, before returning 
to Bavaria to resume his prewar political activities and to agitate for the merging of the KPD 
with the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland (SPD).
 
53
Klaus left Bavaria in 1947 and traveled to the Soviet Zone to continue his studies at the 
University of Jena. There he completed his doctoral studies and was immediately hired as a 
lecturer of dialectical and historical materialism in the Jena Department of Social Sciences. In 
1953 he was appointed professor of logic and epistemology at the Humboldt University in 
Berlin, where he simultaneously held the post of rector. Most of his pre-cybernetic work in this 
period was concerned with materialism and attacks on logical positivism, as with his 1957 book 
Jesuiten, Gott, Materie.
 
54
                                                          
52 Jochen Č erný and Lothar. Berthold, eds., “Georg Klaus,” Wer war wer, DDR: ein biographisches Lexikon (Berlin: 
Ch. Links, 1992). 
53 Č erný and Berthold, “Wer war wer, DDR.” 
54 Georg. Klaus, Jesuiten, Gott, Materie: des Jesuitenpaters Wetter Revolte wider Vernunft und Wissenschaft 
(Berlin: Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1957). 
 In 1959 he was appointed chair of the working group for philosophy at 
the Academy of Sciences. In addition to being a champion of the philosophy of cybernetics, 
Georg Klaus was also a staunch advocate for the establishment of the microelectronics industry 
in East Germany, which saw a massive investment in computing infrastructure after the adoption 
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of the New Economic System (NES) in 1963.55 At the time of the GDR’s fall, it had the only 
significant microelectronics industry in Eastern Europe outside of the Soviet Union—a 
circumstance largely attributable to his profound influence.56
By 1962, a health problem stemming from his internment in Belgium recurred and began 
to worsen; yet despite continuous declines in his health, Klaus continued publishing until the 
year of his death in 1974. He spent the last years of his life bedridden and, no longer able 
physically to write, he penned his last publications with the aid of a dictaphone.
  
57
2.3 Allopoiesis: The Cybernetic Socialist Philosophy of Georg Klaus
  
58
In spite of this prolonged period of ill health, Georg Klaus was the most prolific and 
effective spokesman for cybernetics in the GDR. This effectiveness, as I have already noted, was 
due to Klaus’s extraordinary ability to deflect criticism through the proper use of Marxist-
Leninist language. This rhetorical acumen allowed Klaus to ward off charges of revisionism 
when articulating his hybrid Marxist/cybernetic philosophy. 
 The party was hardly unified in its acceptance of cybernetics. Although the post-Stalinist 
thaw and the widely distributed Kolman lecture had the effect of allowing for the possibility of 
discussion of the discipline, many SED officials, especially those subscribing to a more 
traditionalist outlook, still viewed cybernetics with deep suspicion throughout the 1960s. The 
views of the East German party ideologist Hermann Ley, one the main opponents of cybernetics 
in the GDR, are representative of this suspicion. Writing in his 1961 book Dämon Technik?, Ley 
argued: 
 
                                                          
55 Dolores L. Augustine, Red Prometheus, 265. 
56 Benjamin Robinson, “Socialismʼs Other Modernity: Quality, Quantity and the Measure of the Human,” 705. 
57 Robinson, “Socialismʼs Other Modernity: Quality, Quantity and the Measure of the Human,” 705. 
58 An allopoietic system is one that creates a product distinct from itself, as with a factory assembly line.  
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In [Wiener’s] ideas everything that the bourgeois ideology could produce by way 
of misunderstanding in the mind of an expert comes together. Wiener’s fetish is 
information technique. He reduces man to some special modern problem, 
although he describes the humane use of man in the subtitle of his book [The 
Human Use of Human Beings]: it is a case of leaving technology and natural 
science and entering a false utopia and philosophy.59
Cybernetics develops in both capitalist and socialist countries; however, its 
optimal development occurs only in socialist nations and is possible on the basis 
of the Marxist-Leninist philosophy. The major obstacles which arise from the 
private ownership of the means of production stand in the way of a completely 
successful application of cybernetics in capitalist society. The reasons that the 
classics of Marxism in the nineteenth century have stated that capitalism cannot 
develop an objective science of society…are not contradicted by the use of 
cybernetics in any way.
 
Officials like Ley saw cybernetics as a product of the capitalist world, irrevocably tainted with 
the stain of bourgeois ideology.  
In response to attacks of this kind, Klaus essentially accepted the premise that cybernetics 
was marred by its association with capitalism. The following passage from Klaus’s 1964 work 
Kybernetik und Gesellschaft (Cybernetics and Society) is emblematic: 
60
By accepting the argument of party conservatives, namely that science is a superstructural 
phenomenon shaped by the economic base, Klaus argued for the necessity of his own adaptation. 
If cybernetics is flawed on the basis of its association with capitalism, this does not delegitimize 
it; rather it necessitates the development of a socialist cybernetics, geared toward the interests of 
the working class. As Klaus argued in the same text, science is not and cannot be politically 
neutral, “it serves the interests of the respective ruling class [and] today performs a specific 
social function in the struggle between contrasting social systems.”
 
61
                                                          
59 Quoted in Csizmas, “Cybernetics—Marxism—Jurisprudence,” 96. 
60 Klaus, Kybernetik und Gesellschaft, 9. 
61 Georg Klaus, “Kybernetik und ideologischer Klassenkampf,” Einheit: Zeitschrift für Theorie und Praxis des 
wissenschaftlichen Sozialismus 25, no. 9 (1970): 1180-1181. 
 A socialist cybernetics, it 
follows, would adhere to socialist principles. 
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With the social legitimacy of cybernetics at least tentatively established in the GDR, 
Klaus was left to more substantive debates. Here, I will focus on two lines of argument, meant to 
be representative of Klaus’s broader project of localization. First, I will discuss Klaus’s 
encounter with a specific cybernetic concept, information, and the methods he used to 
contextualize this idea within with a Marxist-Leninist framework. Secondly, I will examine how 
Klaus created cybernetic models of social processes as a method of demonstrating the 
commensurability of the two modes of analysis. 
Probably the most contentious idea in cybernetic thinking to Marxist-Leninist 
philosophers was the concept of “information,” a term which has an idiosyncratic meaning in 
cybernetics. This idea emerged from a 1948 paper by the Bell Labs scientist Claude Shannon 
entitled “A Mathematical Theory of Communication.”62
The most straightforward way to explain information theory is through an overview of 
the binary numeral system. In this scheme, binary digits, commonly known as “bits” replace the 
numbers on the familiar base-10 scale. Binary numbers are written on a base-2 scale, so that the 
number one is 1, two is 10, three is 11, four is 100 and so on. The number one/1 can be said to 
have a bit size, or in information theoretical terms an “entropy” of 1 bit, while the number 
two/10 has a size of two bits, and the number four/100 has a size of 3 bits and so on. As the 
reader has probably deduced, the bit size increases every time an additional digit is added. This 
increase happens on a logarithmic scale; every time the number 2 is iteratively doubled (2, 4, 8, 
 This article, published in two parts in 
July and October 1948 issues of the Bell System Technical Journal, not only generated 
excitement among the Macy Cybernetics group, but spawned the discipline of information 
theory. 
                                                          
62 Claude E. Shannon, “A Mathematical Theory of Communication,” Bell System Technical Journal 27, no. July and 
October (1948): 379-423 and 623-656. 
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16, 32, and so on) a decimal place is added. Shannon understood the information content of a 
given message in probabilistic terms: the larger the bit-count of a message the less statistically 
likely it would be. 63
The fundamental problem of communication is that of reproducing at one point 
either exactly or approximately a message selected at another point. Frequently 
the messages have meaning; that is they refer to or are correlated according to 
some system with certain physical or conceptual entities. These semantic aspects 
of communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem.
 
Shannon’s conception of information in terms of probability had an important 
consequence; it allowed engineers and scientists to divorce the idea of information from its 
meaning, its context, and the medium or channel it was transmitted on. By removing the problem 
of semantics from information, could be treated simply as an engineering problem. As Shannon 
put it: 
64
The mechanical brain does not secrete thought (as the liver does bile), as the 
earlier materialists claimed, nor does it put it out in the form of energy, as the 
 
As a result of the subordination of semantics in information theory, same theoretical models 
could be used to explain human communication, electronic communication, and even cellular 
communication. 
For cybernetic thinkers in the West, the all-encompassing, medium-independent view of 
information took on nearly a metaphysical status. These cyberneticians and information theorists 
enthroned information, alongside matter and energy, as one of the core constituents of reality. 
Norbert Wiener described it this way in his 1948 book Cybernetics:  
                                                          
63 The following example may elucidate this point: suppose we decided to code the results of a coin toss in binary 
digits, so that a heads-up coin would be recorded as 1, and a tails-up as 0. The likelihood of duplicating one tails-up 
flip (coded as 0) is comparatively higher than duplicating the results of three coin tosses, say heads, heads, tails 
(110). Since the probability of duplicating the results of three random tosses is lower, this sequence contains more 
information. Similarly, binary numbers (analogous to our coin tosses) with higher bit sizes are less probable and are 
therefore said to convey more information. 
64 Shannon, “A Mathematical Theory of Communication,” 379. 
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muscle puts out its activity. Information is information, not matter or energy. No 
materialism which does not admit this can survive at the present day.65
Georg Klaus sought to reconcile the concept of information with dialectical materialism while 
maintaining the practical essence of the concept; his primary challenge was to create an 
appropriate ontological description of information. This involved some interesting maneuvering 
within the peculiar physical worldview of dialectical materialism. The conceptualization of 
Western cyberneticians like Wiener and Shannon that information as a third kind of thing – a 
reified concept that was neither matter nor energy – raised the suspicion of Marxist philosophers 
who saw this formulation as evidence of philosophical idealism within the new science. In the 
worldview of dialectical materialism, matter and the interaction of different material objects 
form the totality of experience. Even energy was not seen to exist independently of matter. 
Following Engels, Soviet Bloc scientists and philosophers understood energy as “the mode of 
existence, the inherent attribute of matter.”
 
66
Klaus, for his part, argued “the fact that information is not a physical object...is not an 
argument for the constitution of a ‘third realm of being’“ but did not reject the concept out of 
hand. Instead, he attempted to fit information into one of the already existing categories of 
dialectical materialism.
 The idea of information as being something apart 
from matter flew directly in the face of dialectical materialism and its ontologically unified 
perspective.  
67
                                                          
65 Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics; or, Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine (New York: J. 
Wiley, 1948), 155. 
66 Friedrich Engels, Dialectics of Nature, trans. C. P Dutt (New York: International Publishers, 1940), 35. 
67 Georg Klaus, “Information,” Marxistisch-leninistisches Wo ̈ rterbuch der Philosophie. (Reinbek (bei Hamburg): 
Rowohlt, 1972). 
 He did this by shifting information away from its ontologically 
independent position, and describing it instead, along with energy and substance, as a third 
inherent attribute of material existence. His conception of information differs from the 
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description of the other two aspects of matter; Klaus argued that information should be viewed 
“neither as an object nor the property of an object, but as a property of properties (a second-order 
predicate).”68
The concept of information and the results of information theory come within the 
worldview of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and complement it. Until the mid-20th 
century, we knew two words that appeared, quite rightly, to be the basic terms of 
our scientific worldview: the terms substance and energy. Cybernetics tells us that 
there is a third essential aspect of the matter...[the aspect] information. ... [The 
results of cybernetics have] proved that the informational processes in principle 
cannot be attributed to material or energetic processes. In some sense, with this 
our worldview [dialectical materialism] reaches a sort of culmination which is 
consistent with the level of knowledge of our century.
 Where substance and energy are considered properties of matter (predicates), 
information is viewed as a property of those properties.  
While Klaus conceded that this new attribute of matter was not previously accounted for 
in dialectical materialism, he insisted that information was predicated on material existence and 
that the concept had value to the philosophical enterprise of Marxism-Leninism: 
69
On a higher, more systemic philosophical level, one of the most fundamental divergences 
in Western cybernetics from the principles of Marxism-Leninism, as Klaus and others saw it, 
was its lack of dialectical logic. As Klaus put it in 1970 “already the relatively short existing 
history of the application of cybernetics to social problems clearly shows that a correct 
philosophical basis (i.e. a dialectic-materialist basis) is a prerequisite for the production of 
 
Klaus’s philosophical product is an information theory that was functionally and experimentally 
equivalent to its Western counterpart, but in line with the philosophical and political 
requirements of dialectical materialism. It allowed the East Germans to capitalize on the 
manifold practical applications of information theory, without compromising any philosophically 
entrenched positions. 
                                                          
68 Klaus, “Information.” 
69 Klaus, “Information.” 
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comprehensive objective knowledge.”70
Indicative of this broader style is Klaus’s conceptualization of Marxist contradiction. In 
his view, contradiction and revolution can be explained in the terms of a cybernetic system. 
According to Klaus’s 1969 dictionary of cybernetics, these dialectical contradictions occur when 
“oscillations become ever stronger, eventually leading the system beyond its stability boundaries 
until its quality is destroyed.”
 The primary way Klaus sought to combine dialectical 
logic with cybernetics was through the cybernetic modeling of Marxian dialectical systems. 
71
                                                          
70 Georg Klaus, Kybernetik und Gesellschaft, 55. 
71 Quoted in Benjamin Robinson, “Socialismʼs Other Modernity: Quality, Quantity and the Measure of the Human,” 
96. 
 For Klaus, the “system” takes the place of the Marxian economic 
base. Class conflict is conceptualized as an increasing tide of feedback into a system, which 
generates oscillations and, thus, instability. In cybernetics, stability does not refer to the rigidity 
of a system, but rather its dynamism. Stability is the ability of a system to adapt to different 
environments and changing conditions. A stable system is one responsive to feedback. Thus, a 
system (e.g. capitalism) that is no longer able to respond to feedback (e.g. the struggle of the 
working class) is destroyed by revolutionary force of feedback. 
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Figure 1 – From Kybernetik und Gesellschaft p. 150 
  
Within Klaus’s general discursive framework, several other Marxist concepts can be 
described in cybernetic terms, however this kind of description always comes with heavy 
qualifications and disclaimers. This passage from a September 1970 Einheit article entitled 
“Cybernetics and Ideological Class Struggle” is representative of the philosopher’s broader 
argumentative style: 
The relationship described by Karl Marx of the value and price of goods in 
capitalism, for example, can be brought into a cybernetic control scheme. This 
complicated relationship is much more visible, the laws show themselves to some 
extent already in the visually pure topological scheme, etc. Have we substituted 
the Marxist theory of the relationship of product value and price by cybernetics? 
Of course not! The foundation on which this very simple kind of cybernetic 
economic system is based, has nothing to do with cybernetics. These things must 
be approached from a different science, from [Marxian] political economy.72
                                                          
72 Klaus, “Kybernetik und ideologischer Klassenkampf,” 1183. 
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Klaus’s philosophical task was often to argue for the complementarity of cybernetic analysis 
while being careful to not appear to supplant the domain of Marxist political economy. Despite 
this, Klaus often overstepped his self-imposed boundaries, providing totalizing cybernetic 
models which described society as a complex system composed of interacting, but still 
dialectical, subsystems. For example, figure 1 provides a complex, cybernetic model of society 
as a controlled system with superstructural phenomena such as cultural activities 
(Kulturtätigkeit) being determined, in a Marxian fashion, by the material basis of society. 
Despite his earnest attempts to stay within the boundaries ideological propriety, Klaus aroused 
the suspicion of his critics by blurring the distinctions between a cybernetic view of society and a 
Marxian view of society.  
2.4 Conclusion 
In his oft-cited 1993 article, “How to Be Universal: Some Cybernetic Strategies, 1943-
70” Geof Bowker argues that cyberneticians in the United States and Western Europe thought of 
their new discipline as a universal science, a special “trans-discipline,” whose methodology and 
terminology had transcendent utility, applying equally to both the physical, biological, and social 
sciences. This universality allowed researchers working in fields like sociology and biology to 
add new cybernetic terms like “feedback” to their studies, adding an aura of legitimacy and 
currency. In circular fashion, the usage of cybernetic terminology by researchers bolstered 
cybernetics’ own claims of universality. As Bowker notes, language was the site of this 
exchange: 
A chief feature of the new language was that it operated as a kind of legitimacy 
exchange. ... An isolated scientific worker making an outlandish claim could gain 
rhetorical legitimacy by pointing to support from another field - which in turn 
referenced the first worker’s field to support its claims. The language of 
cybernetics provided a site where this exchange could occur. 
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This process allowed cybernetics to effectively colonize the discursive terrain of a number of 
scientific fields, introducing its terminology into a variety of disciplines.73
The goal of this project of “localization” was not only to create a coherent ideological 
product, but also to initiate a two-way transfer of legitimacy. From Marxism-Leninism, 
cybernetics was invested with the philosophical legitimacy of the state philosophy. Conversely, 
from its “auxiliary science,” cybernetics, Marxism-Leninism received the scientific confirmation 
of an important and modern new science. We see this kind of two-way legitimacy exchange in a 
number of analogous systems. Bohm’s interpretation of quantum theory, at least in part, served a 
 
The confrontation of cybernetics and dialectical materialism in the Eastern Bloc, and East 
Germany in particular, differs in one important respect from the relationships Bowker examines. 
In this case, both fields, Marxism-Leninism and cybernetics, were imagined by their disciples to 
be universal, all encompassing sciences. In this special circumstance, however, the universal 
discipline of cybernetics had to be subordinated to Marxism-Leninism, the state philosophy of 
the GDR. Klaus’s project of localization, as I have argued, is the outgrowth of this process of 
exchange. 
As I have argued, Klaus’s localized version of cybernetics situated itself within the 
discursive space of dialectical materialism by attaching itself to locally appropriate Marxist-
Leninist concepts and metaphors. Within this logic, as I have said, Klaus modified cybernetic 
concepts like information to make them more philosophically congruent with Marxism-Leninist 
princples. On the large scale, Klaus explained and defended the system perspective of 
cybernetics by creating cybernetic models mirroring Marxian conceptions of society and the 
progression of class conflict and revolution as cybernetic systems.   
                                                          
73 Geof Bowker, “How to be Universal: Some Cybernetic Strategies, 1943-70,” Social Studies of Science 23, no. 1 
(February 1, 1993): 116. 
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similar purpose, reconciling dialectical materialism with quantum mechanics.74
The next chapter will examine the implementation of Klaus’s philosophy and the 
factional disputes surrounding the cybernation of the East German economy. As evidenced by 
the young technocrats that this chapter opened with and their economic modeling computer “the 
functionary guillotine,” there was more as stake in these debates than philosophical hegemony; 
 In our own 
cultural situation, we see a similar logic at work in the creation of the “Intelligent Design” 
theory, situating Darwinian evolution within a creationist context. All of these examples involve 
the localization of one universal disciple inside another. In all of these examples, the 
philosophical/scientific product is experimentally identical to the original, but with substantial 
conceptual and cultural adaptations. 
As long as Marxism-Leninism was seen as the senior partner in this exchange, it was not 
seriously challenged. Put another way, so long as cybernetics was a “Marxist Cybernetics” it was 
seen to be providing dialectical materialism with the confirmation and prestige of a modern new 
science, and as a useful tool in the project of building socialism.  By the 1970s,  the SED’s Chief 
Ideologist (Chefideologe) Kurt Hager and other traditionalists within the party saw cybernetics as 
a dangerous, revisionist ideology. For officials like Hager and the new General Secretary Erich 
Honecker, the ideology of the young technocrats I opened the chapter with was no longer 
Klaus’s “Marxist Cybernetics,” but instead “Cybernetic Marxism.” This clampdown on 
cybernetics and other internal reform movements accelerated the economic stagnation of the 
Brezhnev years and played an important part in the collapse of East Germany and the fall of the 
Soviet Union 
                                                          
74 For an excellent exploration of this issue see Andrew Cross, “The Crisis in Physics: Dialectical Materialism and 
Quantum Theory.” 
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they encapsulated a generational conflict between old-guard party officials and young 
technocrats.  
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3 Control: Cybernetics, Market Simulation and State Planning 
The CIA issued a report in 1970 summing up nearly a decade of developments in the 
GDR, which noted the emergence of a new “revisionist” ideology had emerged in the GDR: a 
so-called “cybernetic revisionism.” Unlike “classical revisionism,” which emerged from a 
humanistic reading of the Young Marx and found support among “artists, writers, and 
philosophers,” this new cybernetic revisionism found adherents primarily among scientists and 
engineers and stemmed from a fusion of Marxist-Leninist philosophy with the writings of 
cyberneticians like Norbert Wiener.75 The memo goes on to sketch an outline of this new 
ideological stance, noting its “implicit denial of the dialectic of history,” and the “acceptance of 
central control and the primacy of an expanded elite, which includes the technocrats.” This 
change was attitude was paired with “a critique of ‘bureaucracy’ and acceptance of an 
institutionalized check on the elites by popular economic desires (feedback).”76 As this report 
notes, “conservative party cadres view[ed] this new revisionism as a real danger to themselves 
and their ideology,” a demonstration of the immensely transformative (and politically disruptive) 
potential of cybernetics.77
As this CIA analyst recognized, the history of cybernetics was the GDR is intricately tied 
to the perennial problems of the East German economy. Emerging from the war and Soviet 
occupation with severe structural problems, East Germany looked to science and technology to 
remedy some of these issues. Cybernetics, in particular, was seen by a new generation of 
planners and technocrats as a panacea for the GDR, a solution to many of East Germany’s 
problems with efficiency, labor productivity, and disorganization. 
 
                                                          
75 Central Intellegence Agency, “The Prussian Heresy: Ulbrichtʼ s Evolving System,” ii, 2.  
76 Parenthetical comment appears in the original. Central Intellegence Agency, “The Prussian Heresy: Ulbrichtʼ s 
Evolving System,” 7. 
77 Central Intellegence Agency, “The Prussian Heresy: Ulbrichtʼ s Evolving System,” ii.  
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This chapter seeks to examine how heterodox (but hardly dissident) cybernetic thinkers 
like Georg Klaus worked within the political parameters of the SED to present radical 
alternatives to traditional, Soviet-dominated models of state planning. The primary motivation of 
this chapter is to reconstruct a locus of political contest in GDR: state planning debates in the 
liberalized atmosphere of the 1960s. While not representing a classical “public sphere,” often 
portrayed as a necessary and constituent part of a “modern” society, these debates were the site 
of authentic, if non-public and discursively delimited, political contest. In doing so, this chapter 
is less concerned with the actual political successes of cybernetic reformers (who had an 
important, but highly mixed legacy) than it is with resurrecting the foundations of a substantial 
generational challenge to an older cohort of SED leaders.  
In addition to being the site of pragmatic political concerns, cybernetics was also the site 
of generational, intra-party conflict. The proposed reforms offered by these young technocrats 
would have had the effect of divesting an old guard of SED officials of their powerful positions 
and placing them in the hands of distributed factory-level managers. This conflict was widely 
discussed in contemporary political science literature. Peter C. Ludz in his book The Changing 
Party Elite in East Germany and Thomas Baylis in The Technical Intelligentsia and the East 
German Elite took note of the changing composition of the East German elite in the 1960s.78
                                                          
78 Peter Christian Ludz, The Changing Party Elite in East Germany; Baylis, The Technical Intelligentsia and the 
East German Elite: Legitimacy and Social Change in Mature Communism,. 
 
More recently, Dolores Augustine’s book Red Prometheus argues that ideologically motivated 
party bureaucrats repeatedly clashed with the “apolitical” technical intelligentsia. These 
“apolitical” engineers and specialists were adherents of an “ideology claimed not to be an 
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ideology,” which placed scientific objectivity and the technocratic solutions of this group above 
politics.79
3.1 Economic History 
 
In a way, the local variant of cybernetics in East Germany amounted to the technical 
intelligentsia’s own technology of revolution. It spoke the language of Marxism-Leninism while 
simultaneously negating the dialectical view of history and society. It described socialist society 
in terms of self-regulating systems and subsystems while obscuring those operating the 
technocratic levers and switches. In short, East German cybernetics offered a revolutionary and 
existential challenge to the SED party leadership, a challenge to which they responded in a 
delayed but overwhelming manner. After a period of initial influence under the patronage of 
Walter Ulbricht in the early and mid 1960s, cybernetics was the target of a conservative reaction 
in the wake of the Prague Spring, and it was ultimately suppressed with Honecker’s ousting of 
Ulbricht as General Secretary in 1971. 
In order to get a proper sense of the place of cybernetics in East German history, it is first 
necessary provide some economic context. The Soviet Zone of Occupation (Sowjetische 
Besatzungszone, SBZ) emerged from the war with mixed economic prospects. Despite suffering 
from some of the most destructive effects of Allied bombing campaigns, most notably the 
Dresden firebombing, a substantial amount of the SBZ’s industrial production capacity 
remained. The Soviet zone was also home to some of Germany’s most important high-tech firms, 
such as the scientific equipment manufacturer Carl Zeiss headquartered in Jena, as well as some 
of the county’s most prestigious research universities. In the dawn of the postwar period, it was 
not unreasonable to have an optimistic view of the Soviet zone’s economic prospects. The effects 
                                                          
79 Dolores L. Augustine, Red Prometheus, 23. 
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of Soviet occupation and Germany’s partition, however, had a lasting negative impact on the 
SBZ’s economy. With the exception of brown coal, the East was resource poor; it possessed 
almost no fuel reserves and limited mineral wealth, a situation that necessitated a dependence on 
the Soviet Union for many industrial inputs. As future events confirmed, the Soviet Union 
proved to be an unreliable trading partner, especially in periods of economic volatility. 
The extraction of reparations was even more deleterious to East German economic 
prospects than the occupation itself. These reparations took three major forms: dismantling of 
East German capital stock, deportations of skilled and unskilled laborers to the Soviet Union, and 
the creation of Soviet-owned enterprises (Sowjetische Aktiengesellschaften, SAG) in the SBZ. Of 
these, the dismantling of East German industry had the longest-lasting impact—this often 
involved the complete disassembly of entire factories and their shipment to the USSR. By 1947, 
Soviet authorities had sent over 63,000 tons of German equipment to the USSR, with another 
11,000 tons going to Soviet-aligned countries.80
These labor shortages led the SED, with the backing of the Soviet Union, to raise work 
norms throughout the Republic in an attempt to maintain or even to increase industrial output. 
 In addition to the expatriation of industrial 
capital, East German scientists, engineers, and technicians were also sent to the Soviet Union to 
run reconstructed German labs and factories. 
After the establishment of the German Democratic Republic in October of 1949 and the 
formal division of the country, the economic situation continued to deteriorate. Worsening 
economic conditions lead to the so-called Republikflucht, literally, “flight from the republic,” a 
mass exodus of thousands of East Germans to the Federal Republic. Since many of these 
Republikflüchtling were skilled laborers or members of the technical intelligentsia, this flight 
only exacerbated the existing labor shortages, already a chronic problem in the GDR.  
                                                          
80 “80% of Reparations Sent to Soviet Sphere,” New York Times, November 17, 1947. 
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The East German working class reacted to this change in work norms by holding strikes and 
demonstrations. What started out as a small strike of around 300 East Berlin construction 
workers on June 16, 1953, mushroomed to a protest of about 40,000 demonstrators on the 
following day. Emboldened by their numbers, the protesters called for the resignation of the East 
German government. Although the uprising was put down by German police truncheons and 
Soviet tanks, the affair had a long afterlife in the collective consciousness, effectively shutting 
down the possibility of work norm changes in the future.81
The death of Stalin in 1953 and Khrushchev’s secret speech of February of 1956 had the 
effect of liberalizing policy discussions through the Communist Bloc. After Władysław 
Gomułka’s appointment to First Secretary of the United Workers’ Party that fall, the Polish 
leadership began to sketch an economic reform package that would decentralize authority in the 
national economy and liberalize prices. Despite Gomułka’s successful stand against Soviet 
intimidation (and East German denunciation), the boundaries of orthodoxy in the Khrushchev era 
were brought into sharp relief by the Soviet response to the Hungarian Uprising later that year.
 
82 
With the exception of a few marginal alterations, the East German economy remained on the 
traditional course of multi-year planning; in fact Ulbricht and SED planning officials were 
among the most strident opponents of reformist currents throughout the Bloc. The oft-recounted 
declaration by Ulbricht in 1959 that the GDR would achieve consumer parity with the West by 
1961 was never taken seriously by East German planning agencies and brought no substantial 
changes in policy.83
                                                          
81 This point is argued convincingly throughout: Jeffrey Kopstein, The Politics of Economic Decline in East 
Germany, 1945-1989. 
82 Charles S. Maier, Dissolution (Princeton University Press, 1999), 85-86. 
83 Maier, Dissolution, 86. 
 
43 
 
  
The inflexibility of work norms, as a result of the 1953 uprising, combined with the 
Republikflucht presented East German economic planners with a seemingly intractable situation: 
they could neither anticipate labor supplies nor could they demand increases in worker 
productivity to correct for the shrinking labor pool. This made the long term, campaign-style 
planning systems that the GDR had inherited from the Soviet Union increasingly dysfunctional. 
As a result, in the early 1960s Ulbricht began to appeal to Moscow for a political solution to the 
Berlin problem and on August 13, 1961 construction of the Berlin Wall began. Despite ending 
the flow of labor to the West, the Wall did not deliver East Germany from its economic crisis 
and early the next year Ulbricht began discussing wide-ranging reform.84
3.2 Cybernetics and the Dawn of the Reform Period 
 
It is perhaps surprising that the construction of the Berlin Wall, a symbol of East German  
intransigence, was succeeded by nearly a decade of economic and social reform in the GDR. It is 
especially remarkable that the motive force behind these reforms was Walter Ulbricht himself, 
who has traditionally been portrayed as an unreconstructed Stalinist. Ulbricht had earned a well-
deserved reputation as a fierce opponent of “revisionist” ideological tendencies, not only within 
his own country, but throughout the Soviet bloc. Despite being a late convert to Khrushchev-era 
reformist ideas, the GDR made up for its tardiness with a comprehensive slate of reforms. From 
1963-1965 these policies were implemented at a feverish pace. The reform agenda survived a 
brief setback after a clampdown by the Eleventh Plenum in 1965, but they were eventually 
crippled by the ideological reaction to Prague Spring in 1968 and finally ended by Walter 
Ulbricht’s replacement by Erich Honecker in 1971.85
                                                          
84 Jeffrey Kopstein, The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany, 1945-1989, 48. 
85 Mary Fulbrook, The Peopleʼs State: East German Society from Hitler to Honecker (Yale University Press, 2006), 
252. 
 Indeed, the period that followed the 
44 
 
  
construction of the wall saw sweeping changes to the GDR’s economic system, including a 
decentralization and reorganization of the country’s lagging industrial sector, the overhaul of its 
educational system, and even the adoption of a new constitution in 1968.  
This period also saw the rapid development of cybernetics as a field of scientific inquiry 
in the GDR, which had up until that point been the lonely reserve of a few philosophers and 
mathematicians like Georg Klaus. With official encouragement, cybernetics became a 
formidable transdisciplinary force within the East German academy and the fount of a variety of 
the reformist proposals of the New Economic System. 86
1. “Cybernetics—Philosophy—Society” held on April 24, 1961 in the editorial offices 
of Einheit.
 
In many ways, the story of official cybernetics in the GDR begins in February 1961, 
when Günther Rienäcker, the Secretary General of the German Academy of Sciences at Berlin 
(Deutsche Akademieder Wissenschaftenzu Berlin or DAW), formed a commission on 
cybernetics. The DAW charged this commission, which chaired by Georg Klaus, with preparing 
a scientific report on the status of cybernetics in the GDR. In pursuit of this goal, the commission 
organized a series of conferences devoted to exploring the interrelationship of cybernetics and a 
variety of scientific and philosophical disciplines. The titles of these conferences give an 
indication of the conceptual breadth of early cybernetic thinking in the GDR:  
87
2. “Cybernetics Aspects and Methods in the Economy” which took place under the 
auspices of the Institute for Scientific Economies of the DAW on March 12, 1962.
 
88
3. “Mathematical And Physical Technical Problems of Cybernetics” called by the 
Institute of Applied Mathematics and Mechanics of the DAW, held on March 20-23, 
1962.
 
89
                                                          
86 Heinz Lippmann, “The Limits of Reform Communism,” Problems of Communism 19, no. 3 (1970): 19; Spitmann, 
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4. “Biological Medicine and Cybernetics” held by the Physiological Institute of Karl 
Marx University in Leipzig on October 6, 1962.90
The commission organized a final conference which was held in late October 1962 entitled 
“Cybernetics in the Sciences, Engineering, and Economy of the German Democratic Republic.” 
This conference was intended as a synthesis of the former conferences and as a venue to provide 
the DAW with guidance for future research.
 
91 In addition to scholars from East Germany, it also 
attracted Czechoslovakian and Hungarian academics, including Arnošt Kolman, the 
mathematician who had inaugurated cybernetics’ reevaluation in the USSR (see Chapter 2), who 
had returned to Prague in 1958 and became a member of the Czechoslovak Academy of 
Sciences.92
Cybernetics can assist in the deliberate formation of a social system, such as 
socialism, that is stable by nature. It may be considered a potent instrument of 
 
Attended by members of the Central Committee of the SED, the conference also served 
as a platform for scholars to promote cybernetics as a philosophically-acceptable science and to 
put forward cybernetically-influenced ideas of reform to high-ranking party officials. This 
conference was a watershed moment in the history of cybernetics in the GDR and its policy 
proposals and discussions are worth examining in detail, as they would set the tone for 
cybernetic reforms in the coming decade. Speaking to the assembled crowd in his address, Klaus 
argued for the utility of cybernetics and its synergetic relationship with Marxist theory: 
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socialist planning and organization of the peoples’ economy and of social 
relationships. In this capacity, the necessary utilization of cybernetics creates new 
large-scale tasks for historical materialism. As a theoretical foundation of 
automation, it constitutes a critical component of our modern productivity. It 
must, therefore, be integrated into the system of productive forces categorically 
investigated by historic materialism and it must be examined with respect to its 
effect on man and its impact on the overall system of social productive forces.93
Beyond simply serving as useful tool for socialist construction, Klaus argued that cybernetics, 
with its algorithmic and procedural focus, fulfills the philosophical imperative outlined in Marx’s 
11th thesis on Feuerbach: not just interpreting the world, but changing it.  Klaus argued 
“cybernetics shows a characteristic trait which philosophically brings it close to certain 
Feuerbach theses of Marx. We refer to the predominance of the algorithm compared to the 
theorem. The theorem describes existence while the algorithm provides the incitement to action” 
Cybernetics, he continued “was born as a science of action designed to change the world.”
 
94
Arnošt Kolman continued the philosophical justification of cybernetics and defended the 
discipline from “certain [philosophical] excesses that can be found in our Marxist camp.”
 
95 
Kolman cited two reasons for the hostility of some Marxists to cybernetics. First, he blamed 
misinformation from “hearsay or popular publications” composed of “reactionary false 
conclusions” arrived at by capitalist practitioners for feeding this antipathy.96
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 Secondly, he 
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attributed the remaining hostility to deeply held (but ultimately mistaken) philosophical opinions 
of opponents who saw cybernetics as contradicting dialectical materialism.97
In spite of this vigilant defense of cybernetics, Kolman had a much more limited view of 
its role in a modern socialist society than did Klaus. Kolman argued “it is wrong to see 
cybernetics and cybernetic relationships everywhere… [t]o consider every interaction and 
reaction as feedback—and thus cybernetic in character—is in my opinion erroneous.”
 
98
The remainder of the conference was devoted to applied cybernetic methodology in the 
educational, psychological, biological, and, most importantly for this discussion, economic 
fields. Prof. Dr. Johannes Rudolf, the director of the Institute for Economic Planning, offered the 
most concrete discussion of cybernetic economic methodology. In his paper, “Cybernetics and 
Economic Planning,” he characterized the GDR’s socialist economic system as a cybernetic 
“dynamic self-stabilizing system,” citing Klaus’s Kybernetik in philosophischer Sicht for 
support.
 
99
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 Expanding on this proposition, Rudolf identified four major cybernetic elements in the 
East German economy; the control path, the measurement works, the correction works, control. 
The control path refers to the production process in the national economy. He subdivided this 
element into spheres (production, distribution, and consumption processes), areas of 
responsibility (marked by the responsible state planning agency), fields of production, and 
geographic region. The control path for Rudolf represented a generalized pathway of a 
commodity from a raw to a finished good through a chain of custody. The measurement works 
element refers to the “system of operational and economic accounting and statistics, planning 
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proposals, projection, as well as visual controls in all its forms.”100 In a sense, the measuring 
works element of the national economy was thought of as the central data bank of the cybernetic 
control circuit, storing quantitative and qualitative information for later regulatory action. As 
Rudolf noted, “the sum of this information is the basis of scientific prediction and action for the 
central, branch, and local state organs.”101 The “correctional works” element encompasses the 
entire range of the state’s ability to influence production, and it includes legislation, planning 
tasks, material supplies, wages, taxes, prices, and any kind of directive. Any economic action the 
state can take is included in this category. 102
Rudolf left the final element, control, rather vague and defined it in contradistinction to 
capitalist control. As with much of the jargon of cybernetics, the term “control” has a meaning 
within the field that differs substantially from standard usage. Broadly conceived, control refers 
to the goal orientation of a system, in this case, society. Rudolf defines the control mechanism of 
capitalist society as “law of surplus value.” Surplus value, very generally speaking, can be 
summarized as the difference between the value a laborer instills in a commodity and the 
exchange value a capitalist reaps.
 
103 This is the foundation of profit and capital accumulation. In 
socialism the analogous mechanism was the “law of planned proportional development.” This 
law, as summarized by one Czechoslovak economist, was “the planned management of the 
economy from the center, accompanied by relative independence for enterprises and producer 
groups and the promotion of optimal development and structure.”104
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After laying out a schematic view of the socialist economic system, Rudolf moved to 
identifying “decisive moments” of control or regulation, or in the jargon of the field “leverage 
points,” of that system. Broadly speaking, Rudolf listed these as material and human inputs, 
production relationships, international trade, the requirements of the individual and the state, and 
the distribution of the national income. As with all cybernetic systems, the national economy was 
not conceived of as an aimless loop of activity, but rather a goal-oriented system. Rudolf 
identified two main goals of this “control circuit,” both conceived of in straightforwardly 
Marxian terms. The first of these was the “political goal of society,” that is to say, the building of 
socialism to make way for an eventual (and inevitable) transition into communism. The second 
was the “general human goal of man’s debate with nature” and the increasing fulfillment of the 
material and cultural needs of the population.105
After summarizing the general parameters and goals of the economic system, Rudolf 
concluded with an examination of a number of internal and external “disturbances” (or 
feedback), ranging from natural disasters, to changes in the international political order, and the 
increase in effectiveness in economic management methods. Rudolf noted, without going into 
any further detail that “the control [i.e. the state] must react to such disturbances by either 
changing the regulation magnitude or by creating conditions which allow the retention of the 
original setting.”
 
106
Prof. Dr. Herbert Luck, director of the Rostock University Institute for Political 
Economy, continued the discussion on the economic applications of cybernetics. He was more 
skeptical that Rudolf of the a priori existence of cybernetic systems in the overall economy, but 
he remarked that cybernetic “models allow us to simulate economic processes by means of 
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models so that cybernetic relationships, interactions, and laws of a structural nature may 
be recognized and utilized in economic research.”107
For these participants, cybernetic reforms offered a way for the SED regime to transform 
an ailing economy in a way that was compatible with Marxist-Leninist ideological dictates and 
did not place any serious economic burden on the East German population. In effect, what these 
young planners and philosophers were trying to do was to simulate markets, but in ways 
acceptable to party leaders and to responsible—at least nominally—to accepted theory. Since the 
idea of full market reform was outside of the realm of possibility for SED officials, cybernetic 
reformers sought to incorporate feedback and control systems within the structure of the GDR’s 
national economy. In doing so, these planners attempted to solve the problems identified in the 
socialist calculation debates of the 1920s by the Austrian School economists, Ludwig von Mises 
and Friedrich von Hayek. As these economists saw it, in the absence of market generated price 
signals, economic planners could not attribute meaningful values to raw or finished goods. This, 
they argued, is the logical result of the “knowledge problem.” In market systems, the argument 
goes, knowledge is dispersed and not always explicit; individual economic actors make decisions 
based on price signals, knowledge of local conditions, and what is called “tacit knowledge,” that 
is to say, knowledge that the actor is only partially aware of and is incapable of properly 
communicating.
 For Luck, the primary economic promise of 
cybernetics was its computational, not organizational, possibilities. 
108
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 These participants sought address these problems in two different ways. First, by 
utilizing cybernetic insights about information and control flows, cyberneticians could organize 
the economic system in ways that maximized overall efficiency.  If decision making were to be 
distributed at points within the economic system where actors had specialized knowledge, these 
actors could execute decisions based on local expertise (see the “black box” conception of state 
owned enterprises below for an example of this in practice). This method, in theory, required no 
additional use of computers; in fact, it was intended to diminish the overall need for 
computation, as central planners would only set targets, not engage in long-term prospective 
planning, and decentralized authorities would make decisions on the ground. 
The other method, the creation of computationally complex cybernetic models, suggested 
by Luck, sought to attack the problem of inefficiency from another angle. Cybernetic modeling 
opened the possibility of experimentation in economic planning (heretofore a non-experimental 
discipline).The relative paucity of computing equipment, however, seriously constrained this  
dimension of cybernetic economics. As Luck noted, economic planners in Rostock, an important 
industrial center, only had access to one ZRA-1 (a computer introduced in 1956 by Carl Zeiss 
Jena).109  This paucity of computing equipment—a problem which persisted throughout the 
GDR’s existence—dampened the prospects for this variety of cybernetic application.110
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Organizational cybernetics, however, would become an important inspiration (and justification) 
for the economic reforms of the next decade. 
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3.3 The New Economic System 
In 1963, following a year of consultation with the Soviet economist Evsei Liberman, 
(whose October 1962 publication “Plan, Profit, Bonus” in Pravda initiated a round of serious 
debate throughout Eastern Europe) the SED unveiled the New Economic System (Neues 
Ökonomisches System, NÖS).111 The NES was inspired by a similar set of reforms proposed by 
Nikita Khrushchev in the early sixties, but quickly became more ambitious than anything 
proposed by Moscow or any other Eastern European country (with the exception of 
Yugoslavia).112 The reforms had two main goals: improving industrial efficiency without 
recourse to market reforms, and improving the “quality and qualifications of leading economic 
personnel without sacrificing a commitment to socialist values.”113 The most fundamental aspect 
of the reform was radical de-bureaucratization and devolution of responsibilities from central 
planners to lower-level authorities, but other changes like the retooling of the mechanisms of 
supply allocations, the development of incentive structures, and the initiation of price reforms 
were also important.114
Cybernetic ideas played an important role in this reform package. Several academics in 
attendance at the 1961 cybernetics conference, Klaus and Rudolf among them, were involved in 
the working groups that help craft the NES as well as in high-level discussions on scientific, 
technological, and economic policy throughout the 1960s.
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 Personnel changes in the upper 
echelons of the state planning organs also helped facilitate the rise of cybernetics. In 1963, Erich 
Apel (1917-1965) was named head of the State Planning Commission (SPK), the central 
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planning organ of the GDR. Together with his protégé Günther Mittag (1926-1994), Apel played 
important role in the design and implementation of the New Economic System. A mechanical 
engineer by trade—he worked under Wernher von Braun in the Nazi rocket program during the 
war—Apel was highly receptive to cybernetic ideas and served as a patron for the GDR’s 
technical intelligentsia until his suicide in 1965.116
Apel and Mittag modeled economic planning relationships in the NES on the idea of a 
“black box.” In cybernetics, a black box is a system or object in which only inputs and outputs 
can be viewed while the internal mechanisms of the system or object are obscured. The 
relationships of Volkseigener Betriebe (People/State-Owned Enterprises, VEBs)  to the 
superordinate body, the Vereinigungen Volkseigener Betriebe, (Associations of People’s 
Enterprises, VVBs), for instance, resembles a black box. In this system, the planning authority, 
the VVB, views only the production inputs and outputs of the subordinate VEB, instead of 
micromanaging the entire chain of production. In such a system, changes to production processes 
within in a firm would be undertaken locally, in response to feedback (usually in the form of 
incentives) from the central planning authority. It was thought that this sort of black box 
modeling would ease the workload of central planners, who were burdened by great quantities of 
paperwork, and generally make industrial production more efficient.
 
117
After the institution of the New Economic System, such ideas found expression the 
various official periodicals of the SED. The party press was filled with articles exploring the 
cybernetic contours of the new form of the socialist economy. The most important and visible 
forum for debates on cybernetics in the GDR was Einheit, the SED’s theoretical journal. This 
publication was a mix of philosophical works on Marxist-Leninist theory and articles on the 
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practical application of the principles of dialectical materialism. Einheit (aside from the party’s 
daily newspaper, Neues Deutschland) was the most frequently read publication among party 
officials and was an important vector for the propagation of cybernetic ideas—nearly every issue 
between 1963 and 1971 had a piece providing a cybernetic exegesis of the East German planned 
economy.  
A 1967 essay by Günther Mittag was among the more important examples of this broader 
trend. Mittag’s article dealt mostly with the application of new technologies to socialist 
economics, although it concluded with a substantial section on cybernetics, electronic data 
processing, and operations research. The main goal of this section was to prove the utility of 
cybernetics, very broadly conceived for the East German planned economy. He argued that 
management should “focus its energy on ensuring that the production process, the flow of 
information and the responsibility of the collective will be regulated so as to achieve maximum 
stability.”118
Man can indeed be interpreted as a regulator of social processes…. He is a 
rational being, acting consciously. The man asks the question, for whom he 
 Here, Mittag means “stability” in the cybernetic not the colloquial sense. In 
cybernetics stability does not refer to the rigidity of system but rather its dynamism. Stability is 
the ability of a system to adapt to different environments and changing conditions. A stable 
system is one responsive to feedback. Following Rudolf’s description, this system (socialist 
society) would successfully deal with external and internal pressures marinating the goal-
orientation of “planned proportional development.” 
 Mittag’s cybernetic understanding of the East German economy extended from 
macroeconomic concepts all the way down to the actions of an individual worker. On the social 
nature of labor, Mittag wrote: 
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works. The class-conscious worker will act differently under socialism than under 
capitalism. His action is determined by his own knowledge of class relations. This 
makes it clear that we can fully exploit the insights of cybernetics on the basis of 
Marxism-Leninism.119
Mittag’s specific recommendations, had they been fully adopted, would have been highly 
disruptive to the East German social order. For example, he calls for the “development of 
economic models with the aim of optimizing economic processes.”
 
By describing a Marxist-Leninist concept in cybernetic terms, Mittag engaged in a rhetorical 
strategy common among its East German proponents. By demonstrating the cybernetic 
characteristics of Marxist theory, they sought to underline the discipline’s commensurability with 
dialectical materialism. Indeed, Georg Klaus and others went as far as to call Marx the first 
cybernetician. The philosophical opponents of cybernetics, however, saw the description of 
historical materialist processes from the systems perspective of cybernetics as an illegitimate 
usurpation of philosophical authority of Marxism-Leninism. 
120
Another article in Einheit, this one written by Wolfgang Salecker of the Central Institute 
for Socialist Economic Management for the December 1967 issue, dealt exclusively with 
cybernetics and the planned economy. In it, Salecker identified three main directions for the 
application of cybernetics in the GDR’s planned economy. First, he argued for the utilization of 
cybernetics in scientific control systems in factories, collectives, ministries, and the VVB, which 
would have the intended effect of greatly boosting operational efficiency. Secondly, as with 
Mittag, Salecker called upon cybernetics to aid in the development of mathematical economic 
 By shifting the nature of 
economic planning from party-directed production targets to mathematical economic models, the 
role of the party bureaucrat would have been supplanted, in the all-important realm of industrial 
production, by members of the technical intelligentsia.  
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models for the purpose of optimizing economic processes in the economy at large. Finally, he 
called for the utilization of the insights of cybernetics to rationally to design a new system for the 
rational division of labor in the planned economy as well as to devise a systematic organization 
of relations between state enterprises and central state organs.121
Although cybernetic ideas were discussed with great excitement in the pages of the party 
press and theoretical journals, within the VEBs themselves the application was limited. As 
Jeffery Kopstein notes, cybernetics and systems theory were “…generally the object of ridicule 
among middle- and lower-level enterprise personnel, as few could understand what they were 
studying or how it would apply to the production process.”
 
122
3.4 Visualizing Authority 
 
The influence of cybernetics in the New Economic System was also apparent in the 
proliferation of schematic diagrams of the national economy. This new method of organizational 
diagramming, control flow diagrams (CFDs), represented organizational structures in an entirely 
new manner. Whereas older models, typified by the organizational tree, presented hierarchical 
relationships in a clear, static fashion, CFDs sought to model information flows and regulatory 
action within a system, imbuing organizations with a dynamic, almost kinetic quality. Beyond 
merely illustrating power relationships, these diagrams are images in the imperative mood, 
embodying not only hierarchical relationships but also structuring flows of information and 
chains of command. 
Until the 1950s hierarchical organizational trees were the standard method for 
representing organizations. These charts have a long history; Diderot’s Encyclopédie organized 
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all human knowledge within a hierarchical system.123
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 Even older diagrams, like the great chain 
of being, arranged all forms of life and matter within a hierarchical structure. In diagrams like 
these, the operating metaphor is a genealogical tree, with its incumbent allusions to familial 
power structures. The primary philosophical concern in question in these organizational trees is 
ontology, specifically the social ontology of power. What matters in these charts is the position 
of actors within a hierarchical chain, leaving obscure the functional operation of the system. 
Cybernetic diagramming differs in several important respects. Where organizational trees 
focus on the ontology of concrete power structures, the primary concern of CFD is praxis, 
modeling the ways that information and orders are transmitted through a system. Although this 
kind of organizational representation comes in a variety of metaphorical styles, the most 
common is the electronic circuit. In this kind of symbolic depiction, the transmission of 
information and activity through a system takes center stage, leaving questions of hierarchy 
either minimized or obscured. 
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 Although cybernetic diagramming and modeling enjoyed considerable attention in the 
postwar capitalist west, particularly by the industrial firms advised by the management 
cyberneticist Stafford Beer, these representations were embraced with a surprising degree of 
enthusiasm in the German Democratic Republic during the reform period of the 1960s. Figure 2 
provides a representative example of this style, schematically representing the organizational, 
regulatory, and command structures of the planned economy. As can be seen, the normal vertical 
metaphors of power are absent from this diagram; the superordinate body, the State Planning 
Commission, appears at the bottom left, with its position in the hierarchy only indicated by 
action, namely, its issuance of planning directives (soll). The amorphous, simulated “market” of 
East Germany, meanwhile, is represented by the flow of economic facts (ist) into the ministries 
and any of a host of “disturbances” (Störungen) are represented as being completely external to 
the system. During the implementation of the New Economic System, the schematic 
representation of the organization of the planned economy shifted completely from hierarchical 
organizational charts, to cybernetic CFDs like Figure 2. 
Figure 2 – from Löser, W., Zur kybernetischen Darstellung von ökonomischen Systemen, Deutsche 
Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 14:10 (1966) 1276-1283 p. 1282 
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The reforms proposed by advocates of a cybernation of the GDR’s economy would have 
had the effect of displacing the role of party economic planners with autonomous, independent 
technocrats. The conflict that ensued in committee chambers and in the party press essentially 
represents a battle between SED bureaucrats and members of the technical intelligentsia over 
control of the means of production. Since in the economic system of the GDR the state 
nationalized the means of production, this conflict did not take the shape of a struggle for 
property ownership. Rather, it manifested itself as a struggle over the day-to-day administration 
of state-owned industry. By describing the functioning of state and industry in the scientific 
language of cybernetics, the hierarchal distinctions apparent in GDR society could be obscured 
by the technical intelligentsia behind discussions of self-organizing systems and responsive 
feedback. More fundamentally, cybernetics, with its totalistic, system-level analysis provided the 
GDR with a method of describing itself as a self-regulating system lacking the dialectical 
contradictions of capitalist society. In short, East German cybernetics, for all its talk about self-
regulation, required a helmsman, a regulator, to steer the cybernetic ship of the East German 
economy, a role that would be played by the technical intelligentsia itself. Ultimately, owing 
partially to fears on the part of bureaucrats that decentralization was eroding the authority of the 
SED, the NES was scrapped in 1968 and replaced with the Economic System of Socialism 
(ESS).124
The Economic System of Socialism did not amount to a clean break with the NES; in 
many areas of the economy the trend toward decentralization continued and deepened. In the 
case of a minority of industries, however, the SED directed party planners and ministry 
bureaucrats to reassert central control. This was particularly true of structurally important sectors 
of the GDR economy like machine tool building, chemical and plastic production, and 
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microelectronics. By selectively focusing administrative attention, labor, and investment on the 
production of capital goods and high-tech components, Walter Ulbricht and Günter Mittag, now 
the Central Committee Economic Secretary, sought to overtake the West in a number of key 
industries. This strategy, paradoxically known in the party press as “overtaking without catching 
up” (Überholen ohne Einzuholen), was intended to position the GDR as a global leader in a 
number of selectively chosen industries. The gains in efficiency and productive capacity in these 
sectors of the economy would, it was thought, filter out to the broader economic landscape, 
gradually bringing living standards into a state of parity with the West, with the goal of 
eventually overtaking it.125
3.5 Normalization in Prague, Normalization in East Germany 
 
The fate of reformist cybernetics and, more broadly, the Economic System of Socialism, 
was tightly bound with the events of the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia in 1968. As in the 
GDR, many of those involved in the internal reform movement of the Czechoslovak Communist 
Party took inspiration from cybernetics.126 The subsequent Soviet crackdown (which was backed 
by East German troops) had the effect of slowing the pace of any reforms throughout the 
Communist Bloc. Policies that could be conceived of as “revisionist” or that ran afoul of the 
“Brezhnev Doctrine,” which offered a post hoc justification of the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia were modified or rolled back. In East Germany, the SED eliminated or severely 
circumscribed policies that decentralized decision-making, including many of the cybernetically-
inspired organizational reforms that were part of the ESS. 127
                                                          
125 Interestingly, several of the SED informants interviewed by Kopstein saw nothing contradictory about this phrase 
Jeffrey Kopstein, The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany, 1945-1989, 65. 
126 Gil Eyal, The Origins Of Postcommunist Elites: From Prague Spring To The Breakup Of Czechoslovakia (Univ 
Of Minnesota Press, 2003), 24. 
127 Charles S. Maier, Dissolution, 89. 
 The return of conventional socialist 
economic policy, embodied in the rigid planning methods of Brezhnev and driven home by the 
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example of Czechoslovakia, put reformers on the defensive throughout Eastern Europe. In the 
GDR this ideological reaction continued until December, 1970 when the SED finally abandoned 
the ESS.128
Dialectical and historical materialism cannot and must not be substituted with 
individual sciences or be transformed into an appendage of such sciences. The 
necessary employment of sciences like cybernetics, communication theory, and 
operations research, from the point of view of applied mathematics or the 
concrete management of the economy, may not lead to the fact that terms and 
concepts from these sciences step into the place of Marxism-Leninism. We 
restrict the importance of individual sciences which address questions like system 
and structure control and regulation, but for the management of all social 
processes with the construction of the socialism, for the guidance of the 
revolutionary class conflict there can be only one science, and this is the Marxism 
Leninism.
 
With the fall of Walter Ulbricht from power in May 1971, cybernetics lost an important 
advocate. Ulbricht’s replacement Erich Honecker and his circle were not as receptive to the 
arguments of Klaus, and cybernetics fell from official grace in this period. Leading the charge 
against the science was Kurt Hager, a Politbüro member and the chief ideologist of the SED. 
In the Novemeber 1971 issue of Einheit, Hager launched a blistering attack against cybernetics 
and its East German proponents. While accepting the role of “legitimate” research in cybernetics 
in the GDR’s scientific community, he denounced works that tread on the philosophical 
hegemony of Marxism-Leninism: 
129
Hager goes on to argue that “trying to describe the nature of socialist society with the cybernetic 
concept of a system has the effect of undermining the socioeconomic and class content of 
socialism.”
 
130
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In his repudiation of cybernetics Hager returned to the rejectionist tropes of the 1950s. By 
arguing that the systems-view of society undermined the class content of socialist society, 
however, Hager did something new. The basic argument was that by interjecting the language of 
cybernetics into the discourse of the party, the cybernetic revisionists remove the class-
conscious, polemic nature of party rhetoric. This process, Hager warned, would have the effect 
of changing the party’s mission. In short: “the party would stop being a Marxist-Leninist 
party.”131
3.6 Conclusion: 
  
Writing in 1976, after the replacement of Walter Ulbricht by Erich Honecker, the Czech 
political commentator, Jaroslav Krejčí, remarked: 
So far, cybernetic and similar considerations seem to be, to borrow [Gabriel] 
Almond’s terms, a part of the exoteric (i.e. window dressing) rather than the… 
operative…doctrine of the party, yet what is still more important is that the 
cybernetic, technocratic orientation seems to have suffered a setback by the 
replacing of Walter Ulbricht by Honecker as First Secretary of the SED.132
The second point made by Krejčí is undisputed—East German cybernetics never fully recovered 
following the fall of Ulbricht from power. The first point, that the cybernetic rhetoric of the SED 
amounted to little more than “window dressing,” however, assumes a uniformity of outlook and 
ideology within the party that never existed. A conservative faction within the SED consistently 
distrusted cybernetics for its alleged bourgeois origins and its lack of ideological rigor. On an 
even more fundamental level, however, these officials found the ideology unacceptable, since it 
decentralized decision making, and removed the party (and these party members) from the 
economic levers of power. In the place of these bureaucrats would be career technocrats, goal-
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oriented technicians that may not share the Marxist-Leninist convictions of orthodox SED 
officials.    
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4 Conclusion: Technology of Control, Technology of Liberation 
The narrative this thesis has put forward—one in which cybernetics, initially rejected in 
East Germany for ideological reasons, rose to an impressive degree of influence and prominence, 
only to be erased from the philosophical landscape not even a decade later—seems, on some 
level, incomplete and altogether too clean. After all, it seems remarkable that a philosophy that 
served as an important guiding force in the GDR’s policy-making circles could vanish from the 
intellectual scene overnight.  By the time of Honecker’s elevation to General Secretary of the 
SED in 1971, cybernetics had built itself into a major force within the party and the academy and 
it seems implausible that the story should end there.  
In many ways, the story of cybernetics in the GDR, while differing substantially on 
questions of scale and official support, shares important features with the history of the science 
in the United States. Both countries experienced an intense, albeit brief, period of interest from 
industry and the state presided over by a strong central personality: Norbert Wiener in America 
and Georg Klaus in East Germany. In both countries when official support for the discipline 
waned, cybernetics fragmented, leaving fields like general systems theory, artificial intelligence, 
operations research, network theory, and industrial automation in its wake. This should not be 
surprising; cybernetics was never so much a discipline in its own right as it was a methodological 
approach, a way of looking at the world, an interdiscipline. It was also an empire-building 
science, seeking to subsume other fields of inquiry, from cellular communication to aesthetic 
theory, within its paradigm.133
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When the ideological attacks of the Honecker regime began, cybernetics began to 
fracture and its subfields began to emancipate themselves from the imperial aegis of the 
interdiscpline. This entropic process was accelerated by the illness of Georg Klaus, who despite 
still writing on cybernetics until his death in 1974, was bedridden and unable to exercise any 
considerable amount of influence. By that point, however, cybernetics as unified field of inquiry 
was effectively moribund; after 1972 there was a conspicuous decline of articles on the subject in 
the party press.  
Although the 1970s saw a precipitous decline in the credibility of cybernetics within SED 
circles, the same was not true of other high tech fields. The allied fields of information 
technology (IT) and automation became the subject of increasing interest in East Germany, 
especially after 1976. Responding to erratic fuel and raw materials imports, and dwindling labor 
supplies, SED leaders instituted a policy of Intensivierung (intensification), which saw renewed 
attention to microelectronics and computer-controlled machine tools.134
Throughout the last two decades of its existence, East Germany had the most developed 
high tech sector within the CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, also known as 
COMECON). During the late 1970s, the bloc countries cooperated on the production of high 
tech equipment, distributing component production throughout the CMEA countries. During this 
period the GDR ran high balances of trade on high tech components, but received very few 
 In many ways IT and 
automation filled the discursive roles previously held by cybernetics—both were seen as ways to 
rationalize the planned economy but without the requirement of institutional overhaul and 
decentralization. As with cybernetics, however, the prospects of these high technology fields 
were dampened by internal political contradictions and complicated, often acrimonious 
relationships within the broader socialist community.  
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finished goods. In this climate, East Germany embarked on an autarkic plan of microelectronics, 
centralizing research (buttressed by the industrial espionage of Western products) and production 
within the country. The result was a highly expensive and only marginally successful IT sector; 
despite some successes, East German computer production never came close to satisfying 
internal demand.135 More dangerously, as Gary Geipel has noted, “while information 
technologies brought about stunning change in other societies…IT development in East 
Germany was seen as a replacement for economic reform and political change.”136 This ideology 
was explicitly integrated into Erich Honecker’s rhetoric; speaking to Western reporters in 1987 
he argued that microelectronics and IT put the GDR “…in the position of continuing our tried 
and trusted course of economic and social policy, in spite of complicated international 
conditions.”137
The experience of cybernetics, computers, and socialist modernity in the GDR poses the 
inevitable counterfactual question: could cybernetic reforms, earnestly adopted, combined with a 
baseline of computational power, have rejuvenated the East German planned economy? This 
question, of course, can never be answered, but the history of Allende’s Chile provides an 
interesting if fleeting, clue. In 1971, just as the last stage of the backlash against cybernetics in 
the GDR was beginning, the new socialist president of Chile, Salvador Allende, met with the 
British cybernetician Stafford Beer to discuss the reconfiguration of the Chilean economy along 
socialist and cybernetic lines.
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 Although the 1973 Pinochet coup cut the experiment short, the 
Chilean cybernetic command system, known as “Cybersyn,” achieved reasonable success with 
very limited technology. Composed of a network of telex machines (technology developed in the 
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1930s) ,which connected factories to a central operation room in Santiago, the Cybersyn system 
succeeded in maintaining the flow of goods during the 1972 CIA-backed truck driver strike.139
Although the example of Allende’s Chile provides an interesting example of the use of 
cybernetic methods in a more humanistically inclined socialist state, it is also important to note 
that cybernetic and systems theoretical approaches have not only been used as the tools of 
“control” from above, but also as resistance and destabilization from below. To take one topical 
example, the strategy of Julian Assange of WikiLeaks is motivated by a systems understanding 
of state secrecy networks. In his short “manifesto,” “State and Terrorist Conspiracies,” and 
elsewhere Assange  appropriates theoretical models designed for detecting and destabilizing 
covert terrorist networks, and deploys them in an attempt to undermine that state secrecy 
apparatus.
 
Although key aspects of the system were never completed (including CHECO, a project to 
model the Chilean economy and serve as a experimental platform to test policy changes), 
Cybersyn proved to be a flexible and responsive way to handle the unexpected contingencies that 
repeatedly rattled the planned economy of the GDR.  
140
                                                          
139 Medina, “Designing Freedom, Regulating a Nation,” 593. 
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In Assange’s thought covert organizations, whether state, corporate, or terrorist, are best 
understood as distributed cybernetic communications networks. Assange sees the “leak” as a 
tactic for disrupting a convert network’s information sharing pathways; since the publication of a 
leak provokes a response that degrades the efficacy of a network (i.e. it eliminates 
members/nodes and, thus, reduces information sharing). The content of the leak is not important, 
what really matters is the reaction the leak generates; the overall goal is to reduce the number of 
actors and communications links in a covert system in an effort to reduce the system’s power. 
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The morality and effectiveness Assange’s enterprise are up for debate, but this example 
should make clear that we should not view cybernetics and systems theory solely as tools for 
social engineering and control, or as a necessarily constituent technology of Donna Haraway’s 
“informatics of domination,” a scientific system that translates the “world into a problem of 
coding, a search for a common language in which all resistance to instrumental control 
disappears and all heterogeneity can be submitted to disassembly, reassembly, investment, and 
exchange.”141
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Postmodern Turn: New Perspectives on Social Theory, ed. Steven Seidman (Cambridge University Press, 1994), 
102. 
 I think this is an incomplete picture—as a science of the operation of systems, 
cybernetics is equally suited for control and resistance. In cybernetic terms, if one understands 
the “stability parameters” of an oppressive system, one knows how to take that system down.  
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